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ABSTRACT MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the end of global confrontation and the subsequent
disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about a real opportunity for European
unification and transatlantic security. Thus, there is a unique chance for the states of
Central and Eastern Europe to build an improved security architecture in the whole Euro-
Atlantic area after half a century of division. That is why Central and East European
countries are seeking to join NATO and in that way provide increased stability, peace and
security for all, without creating new dividing lines.
To join NATO all Central and East European countries need to accomplish
democratic transformation especially in the system of civil-military relations. Democratic
civilian control of the military is one of the main prerequisites for Central and East
European states to qualify for inclusion in NATO. Thus, NATO enlargement can promote
democratic transformations of the East European countries, especially in civil-military
relation realm, and integration of the Central and East European countries into the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. By admitting new members NATO will make itself better
able to address Europe's new security challenges. Such a broad concept of security
embracing political, economic and defense factors can be the basis for the new security
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Under European communist regimes, the military was completely subordinated to
the Communist Party through a system of political commissars. The military was also
subordinated to Moscow and the requirements of the Warsaw Pact. Moscow determined
defense policy, military doctrine and even military strategy for the members of the Warsaw
Pact. The disappearance of such geopolitical realities as the Warsaw Pact and the USSR
has removed the old totalitarian pressure from half of the European continent. This
development has enabled many nations to integrate with Euro-Atlantic institutions.
To integrate into Western institutions, especially NATO, all Central and East
European countries must accomplish the democratic transformation of their civil-military
relations because democratic civilian control of the military is one of the main
requirements for Central European states to qualify for inclusion in NATO. This thesis
argues therefore that civil-military relations can be seen as an indicator for the post-
communist reforms in Central and East European countries. In addition, the degree of
democratic civilian control over the armed forces forms a measure of the stability and
durability of the state, the depth of democratization processes. This thesis analyzes how
NATO enlargement has promoted democratic transformation in Central and East
European countries, especially in the civil-military relations realm and, as a result, how the
integration of Poland into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has unfolded in the
recent past.
In order to understand what changes must be made for civil-military relations to
accomplish democratic transformation the author describes the system of military control,
IX
the unique pattern of civil-military relations in the Warsaw Pact Countries and provides
answers for the three important questions:
1. What has been the character of communist civil-military relations ? What has
been their structure andfunctions?
2. What is the framework of the democratic model of civilian control over the
armedforces?
3. What have post-communist countries done to replace old civil-military
relations and to establish new democratic control over the military?
The author argues that, in order to transform communist to democratic political
systems, all post-communist countries must establish effective mechanisms of democratic
civilian control over the armed forces and institutionalize democratic military
professionalism. According to the author's view, having analyzed the Polish experience on
the road to democracy, one can suggest patterns of process of democratic transformation
from communist to democratic civil-military relations that are surely appropriate for
Ukraine.
The process of self-identification of Ukraine has not been accomplished yet and
still under way. The new Ukraine is not a part of the Soviet Union anymore. Its new
borders, options, culture, and inner development made Ukraine another state that
previously had not existed on the global political or geographical maps. New postsoviet
Ukraine's renaissance has been already lasting for seven years after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991. Seven years is a short period to mold national consciousness, shape
political system, and perceive national development objectives and prospects. It is
understandable that Ukraine's standing has much in common with the universal long-term
interests of any nation:
• military security;
• political sovereignty; and
• sustainable economic development.
Obviously, the main effort ought to be focused on Ukraine's restoration and
growth as a democratic country living in harmony with itself and the outside world. It
should be the foundation for the national accord and unity of Ukrainian society and the
creation of an open society that includes the triangle of market economy, a civil society,
and a legally organized state. From the author's view, every nation has a unique historical
experience, but the successful existence and peaceful development of NATO as a
voluntary alliance of sixteen democratic states, the complete absence of military coups and
arbitrary military rule in these countries throughout the history of NATO makes its
experience universal for the other nations. In addition, history shows that democratic
states very seldom go to war with another. That is why the experience of NATO in
providing democratic civilian control over the military, acceleration of democratic reform,
military integration and defense cooperation among the nations is extremely valuable for
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A. THE NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AFTER THE COLD-
WAR: DILEMMA OF NATO ENLARGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
"Study my brothers, think and read, learnfrom the others,
but don 'tforsake your own.
"
T. Shevchenko 1
The end of the Cold War can best be dated to that moment on December 25, 1991
when the Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin for the last time. Thus "began an era of
change of historic proportions.'''1 This thesis addresses aspects of this change as it
concerns the soldier in the state in Central and Eastern Europe.
NATO today provides a new basis for stability, democratization and peace in
Europe. This thesis analyzes the role of NATO enlargement in the promotion of
democratic transformation in the Central and East European countries, especially in the
sphere of civil-military relations. In particular, I examine the role ofNATO enlargement in
assisting democratization in Poland. Further, I asses the extent to which Poland met the
political criteria for membership, especially in providing a new system of democratic
control over the military.
Collective defense remains imperative for European security. The dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union eliminated the primary threat that NATO met
1 John P. Connell, "Ukraine," The DISAMJournal ofInternational Security Assistance Management
,
No. l.Fall 1996, p.l.
2 Richard Holbrooke "America, a European Power," Foreign Affairs 1995, no. 2 (March-April), p. 38.
during the Cold War. The division of Europe into spheres of influence made by the Yalta
Agreement in 1945 does not exist anymore. 3 However, military conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, the GulfWar, recent acts of terrorism and clear dangers from the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, demonstrate that threats endure that endanger Euro-
Atlantic security. In these circumstances the United States and its Atlantic partners can
assist European integration and create greater security for themselves by engaging the
Central and East European countries in the context of liberal democracy, economic
prosperity, and military cooperation thereby increasing stability and diminishing threats to
2 Yalta Agreement. "A major executive agreement concluded during World War II at a summit
conference ofthe Big Three (President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and
Premier Joseph Stalin) held at Yalta in the Russian Crimea in February 1945 to developjoint strategy in
the final stages ofthe war against Germany and Japan, and to resolve postwar political problems. The
Yalta Agreement included a number ofimportant decisions concerning war strategy andpostwar policies,
including those relating to the nature ofthe proposed United Nations organization. War-related decisions
included in the Agreement were: (1) a guarantee that there would be free, democratic elections in the
liberated countries ofEastern Europe implemented by coalition governments composed ofcommunists
and noncommunists; (2) a decision that Poland would be compensatedfor land lost to Russia by annexing
all German territory up to the Oder and Neisse rivers, with the subsequent transfer ofmillion ofGermans
out ofthe area; (3) an agreement that there would be an Allied occupation ofdefeated Germany,
reparation would be exacted, war criminals would be brought swiftly to justice, and vigorous de-
nazification program would be carried out; (4) a commitment ofSoviet entry into the war against Japan
within three months ofthe end ofthe European war, in exchange for certain benefits, including Soviet
annexation ofthe Kurile Islands and the southern part ofSakhalin Island, a recognition ofSoviet
hegemony over Mongolia, and a guarantee ofrailroad and port rights in China; and (5) a promise by
Stalin to recognize Chiang Kai-shek as the sole spokesman for China by concluding a treaty ofalliance
with him. Major decisions concerning the proposed United Nations organization included (1) original
membership in the new world organization would be open to all states that declared war against the Axis
Powers by March 1, 1945; (2) the Soviet Union would receive three memberships, one each for the Soviet
Union, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia; (3) the veto power in the Security Council would be limited to use
on substantive but not procedural questions, and it could not be used by a party to a dispute to block
Council consideration; and (4) a trusteeship system would be established to replace the League of
Nations mandates system. " Barbara P. McCrea, Jack C. Piano, George Klein, "The Soviet and East
European Political Dictionary," ABC-Clio, Inc., 1984, pp. 343-344.
peace. 4 This new security architecture is based on the idea that it is better to integrate
rather than to divide Europe. Since 1991, NATO enlargement has already begun to:
a.) foster democratic reforms and stability;
b.) strengthen NATO's capacity for collective defense;
c.) promote regional harmony and spread NATO's burdens more broadly;
d.) help avoid a destabilizing zone of insecurity and turmoil in Europe;
e.) create a better Central and East European climate for market growth and
prosperity. 5
To provide stability and security for post-Cold War Europe, Article X of the
1949 Washington Treaty states that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shall
admit new members that have adopted democratic criteria to provide greater civilian
control over the military, expanded freedom for civil society and enacted other steps
essential to the success of democracy in the region. 6
4 Central and East European countries. "Collective name for theformer communist countries and their
successor states, i.e. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Yugoslavia. It may
also include theformer Soviet republics, in particular Belorussia, Moldova and Ukraine. " Harry Drost,
What is what and who is who in Europe, Simon & Schuster. 1995, p. 85.
5 Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale,
Benefits, Costs and Implications (Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, February 24, 1997), The U.S. Department of State Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.state.gOv/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html#executive. Available 3 March 1997.
6 In January 1994 at the NATO Summit in Brussels, allied leaders committed themselves to accept new
members into the North Atlantic Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty.
The 1994 Brussels Declaration ofNATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that the Alliance was
open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Washington
Treaty and to contribute to security in the North Atlantic Area. Chapter 1 of The NATO Enlargement
Study (1995) clearly defined that one of the main aims of enlargement is to promote civilian and
democratic control of the military: 'Enlargement will contribute to enhanced stability and securityfor all
countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by ... encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including
civilian and democratic control over the military. " See Study on NA TO Enlargement { Brussels:
September 1995), NATO Online. Available HTTP: http://www.nato.int/doci^asictxt/enl-9501.htm
At the crucial NATO summit in Madrid on July 1997, NATO's sixteen heads of
state and government invited three states from among the new democratic countries of
Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland) to start Alliance
accession talks. The Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Javier Solana, said: "The Madrid
Summit has provided a comprehensive action planfor the future. It has given us a NATO
where the commitment to wider European security and stability is no longerjust a policy,
but is now firmly reflected in the way we do business. The decisions taken at the Summit
demonstrate that we are on course towards our goal: building a new NATO for a new
and undivided Europe. "7
At the same time, all Central and East European countries must continue
democratic transformation, especially in the pluralistic system of civil-military relations, to
be eligible for NATO membership. Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, a researcher at the Hungarian
Mission of the United Nations in New York, argues: "In any country, the status of civil-
military relations is inseparable from the democratic nature of the political and military
elites. Civil-military relations can therefore be seen both as an indicator and the testfor
reform in Central Europe.
"8 The degree of civilian control over the military forms an
excellent measure of the "durability and stability of the new political structures, the depth
7 Javier Solana, "Building a new NATO for a new Europe," NATO Review, No. 4, Vol. 45, July-August
1997 - Summit Edition, p.3.
8 Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, "Central European Civil-Military Reforms At Risk", Adelphi Paper 306 IISS,
Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 5.
of the democratization process, and even the trend in political developments in the
region. y
Furthermore, democratic control of defense is a common priority, for three main
reasons:
First, it is an essential element of democracy. As Kant taught us,
democracies are much less likely to go to war, especially against one another:
therefore, democratic control of defense increases the likelihood that a country
remains at peace, and thus improves its security, which is what defense forces are
all about.
Second, far from tying its hands, democratic control of defense is useful
for the military. The latter, just as other organizations, benefits from external
scrutiny and oversight which catalyze improvement and help prevent abuse and
waste; as demonstrated in many European countries and elsewhere in the world,
a more transparent military is more efficient and effective than one which
operates in social seclusion and above the law.
Third, democratic control of defense provides the armed forces with
indispensable legitimacy. In doing so, it earns them a greater degree of
acceptance and respect by society at large, which they will need when seeking
manpower (including conscripts) and national resources. 10
9
Ibid., p. 5.
10 Marco Carnovale, " NATO Partners and Allies: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the
Armed Forces," NATO Review, No 2-March 1997, p. 32.
Therefore, in view of the above, this thesis is based on the premise that the
political and social transformations in society affect civil-military relations. The communist
political system has been characterized by communist civil-military relations, and a
democratic political system is characterized by a variety of democratic civil-military
relations. To change a political system from totalitarian to a democratic society we also
must rebuild civil-military relations. We must be sure that the military plays a role
according to the principles, norms and values of the democratic society. This issue has
emerged with drama and force in Europe since 1989, as it has in earlier periods of
upheaval and change.
In order to understand what changes should be made in civil-military relations to
accomplish the democratic transformation of totalitarian communist regimes to
democracy, this thesis describes the system of the military control and a unique pattern of
civil-military relations that characterized the countries of Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) and provides answers for the three important questions:
/. What are communist civil-military relations? What are their structure and
functions?
2. What is the framework of the democratic model of civilian control over the
armedforces?
3. What should post-communist countries do to replace old civil-military
relations and to establish new democratic control over the military?
In order to become a NATO country, Poland has fostered democratic reforms and
established a new system of civil-military relations to provide stability within society and
effective democratic control of the armed forces according to the NATO's membership
principles. Having analyzed the Polish experience on the road to democracy, this thesis
seeks to uncover the process of democratic transformation from communist to democratic
civil-military relations. It further seeks appropriate ways and models for other countries in
the Partnership for Peace (PfP), particularly for Ukraine.
B. THE THESIS IN OVERVIEW
Chapter II outlines the principles and criteria of NATO enlargement and their
influence on the promotion of democracy and reforms in civil-military relations. This
chapter also describes the democratic structure of civilian control over the military.
Chapter III examines civil-military relations in the communist era. Furthermore it
describes the system of military control and the unique patterns of civil-military relations
in the Warsaw Pact Countries (WPC) as a whole and in Poland, especially.
Chapter IV offers an overview of the process of democratic transformation of
civil-military relations in Poland including outstanding problems, difficulties and positive
results.
Chapter V discusses the conclusions of the study and author's view of what
Partner countries need to do to accomplish democratic transformation and provide
democratic civilian control over the armed forces.

H. NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE NECESSITY FOR DEMOCRATIC
REFORM EN CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
A. INFLUENCE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON PROMOTION OF
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES EN CENTRAL AND
EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
While long open to debate and criticism, the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is to safeguard the freedom and security of its democratic
membership by political and military means. The alliance is based on the common values of
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. "The role played by the North Atlantic
Alliance, from its establishment in 1949 to the end of the Cold War four decades later,
was fundamental in bringing about the conditions which made these developments
possible. As the instrument for guaranteeing the security, freedom and independence of
its members, maintaining a strategic balance in Europe and promoting democratic
values and the emergence of European democratic institutions, the Alliance created the
stability which was the precondition for bringing an end to the adversarial relationship
between East and West ". J
1
Indeed, NATO was created to thwart the spread of totalitarianism westward from
Moscow "when the leaders of the West created the most successful peacetime collective
security system in history, centered around the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan,
NATO, Atlantic partnership-andAmerican leadership". 12
11 NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), NATO Online. Available
HTTP: http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/hbOOOOOe.htm
12 Richard Holbrooke "America, a European Power," Foreign Affairs 1995, no. 2 (March-April), p .39.
After the Cold War the divisions of Europe never really disappeared. Europe is
divided into three zones:
• the integrated and democratic West;
• the part of the former USSR reintegrating with Moscow;
• former Warsaw act members and former Yugoslavia.
NATO is the only security system to have survived and, for the time being, it
stands alone as the guardian of stability in Europe. The newly liberated countries in
Central Europe therefore have a vital interest in NATO's future policies and organization,
and they should take an advantage of opportunities for diplomatic liaison that enable them
to influence the Alliance's policies and deeds.
In these new political conditions, the fall of communism presented the alliance with
the opportunity to weigh the costs and benefits of expanding toward its former enemies.
Statesmen had to create a new political-military framework to provide stability and
security in all of Europe. The new structure must unite NATO and the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. NATO is a defense alliance of democratic states connecting the
Alliance with the Central and Eastern Europe countries. It would integrate these countries
into the process of liberal democracy, economic prosperity, and military cooperation,
thereby increasing stability and diminishing threats to peace.
This political process started in 1990, soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 13
13Berlin Wall. "An action taken at the instigation ofthe General Secretary ofthe Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, in August J96] to fortify and seal offEast Berlinfrom West Berlin.
The building and militaryfortification ofthe Berlin wall were rapidly extended to the entire border
between West Berlin and the surrounding East German territory, and to the entire East German-West
German border. The building ofthe Berlin Wall and the borderfortification between East and West aided
the industrial expansion ofEast Germany by stopping the general exodus into West Germany. Because
10
In July 1990, thanks in part to President Bush, "NATO's London Summit
Declaration set out new goals for the Alliance, called for changes in its strategy and
military structure and declared that the alliance no longer considered Russia an
adversary.
"
,4 The Allies declared:
In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we
today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and
representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to
come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council. We today also
invite the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the
Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to
come to NA TO, notjust to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison
with NA TO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our
thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change. Our Alliance
will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are
ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military
the building ofthe wall evoked only a verbal responsefrom the West, the Soviets could assume that it
amounted to a tacit agreement ofthe post-World War II division ofEurope. The treaties later signed
between East Germany and West Germany regularized policies on border crossing and millions of
Germans could visit across the wall. The Berlin Wall itselfremainsfor many a symbol ofSoviet
intransigence. " Barbara P. McCrea, Jack C. Piano, George Klein, "The Soviet and East European
Political Dictionary, "ABC-Clio, Inc., 1984, pp. 310-311.
14 Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale,
Benefits, Costs and Implications (Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, February 24, 1997), The U.S. Department of State Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.state.gOv/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html#execuUve. Available 3 March 1997.
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Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European
capitals} 5
Those efforts were reaffirmed by the Alliance's declaration in Copenhagen in June
1991, which stated that NATO's objective was "to help create a Europe whole and
free.
"16
At NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991, the Alliance adopted a New
Strategic Concept, which reaffirmed the continuing importance of collective defense
while also orienting NATO toward new security challenges, such as out-of-area missions,
crisis management and peacekeeping operations.
In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied
security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional,
which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of
responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security ofAlliance
members are to be preserved. 17
Manfred Worner, the late NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the North
Atlantic Council emphasized that the steps decided on by Heads of State and Government
in London contained five important key elements:
15 London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance (Brussels: NATO Information Service,
5-6 July 1990), Articles 7 and 8. NATO Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c900706a.htm
16 Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, Copenhagen, 6-7 June
1991 in NATO Communiques 7PP7(Brussels: NATO Office Information and Press, 1992), NATO Online.
Available HTTP: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c910607a.htm
17 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, NATO Press Communique S- 1(9 1)86, 8 November
1991, Article 8, NATO Online. Available HTTP: http://www.nato.intydocu/comm/c91 1108a.htm
12
• The establishment of a new relationship with the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe, once allied against NA TO in the Warsaw Pact
but now seeing in the Alliance a willing partner in their desire to draw
closer to the West, and overcome a sense of isolation and insecurity;
• The elaboration of a new military strategy that would not only reflect
the fact that NATO no longer faces a single overwhelming threat but
which would also allow the Alliance to manage the more probable
security challenges and crises it willface in thefuture;
• The determination to strengthen the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and endow it with permanent
institutions that would make CSCE more effective as a pan-European
forum for cooperation and an instrument for managing crises and
peacefully settling disputes;
• A commitment to pursue the arms control process beyond the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty with the aim of limiting
the offensive potential of armedforces to the point at which surprise
attack or major aggression would become impossible. A related aim
would be to build trust and transparency with regard to the military
activities ofall CSCE states;
• The encouragement of a European security identity and defense role,
reflected in the construction of a European pillar within the Alliance,
13
as a means of creating a more balanced and mature transatlantic
partnership of equals.™
At the same Summit, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) to provide an institutional framework for political and security cooperation
between NATO and the former communist states. 19
Reka Szemerkenyi argues: "NATO's J99J Strategic Concept was the first key
document to promote active cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe. This
document included two existing concepts of defense and dialogue and adopted a new
one: cooperation with countries to NATO's east. The document also emphasized the role
of shared democratic principles by East and West. As the establishment of democratic
civil-military relations was one of these newly shared values, NATO began actively
18 Manfred Worner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit," NATO Review 1991
No. 6 (November-December), pp. 3-8.
19 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) intergovernmental organization. "An initiative ofthe
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the NACC-not to be confused with the North Atlantic
Council (NAC), a NATO institution-wasfounded in December 1991 with the aim ofbuilding greater
security in Europe and to provide a practical basisfor 'dialogue, partnership and consultation ' between
NA TO and theformer communist countries ofEastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The organization has
38 members, namely the 16 NATO countries, theformer members ofthe Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe,
the 15former Soviet republics, andAlbania; Finland has observer status. NACC meetings, held at
foreign-minister level, havefocused on general security issues, arms control measures and means of
resolving regional conflicts. Under the NACC's auspices NATO is also extending expertise to theformer
communist countries on such matters as training military personnel, creating the structuresfor
democratic control ofthe armedforces, and converting arms industries to civilian use. " Harry Drost,
What is what and who is who in Europe, Simon & Schuster. 1995, p.85. "The creation ofthe North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991 established aframeworkfor dialogue and
cooperation with the countries ofCentral and Eastern Europe and with the newly independent states
which emergedfrom theformer Soviet Union. The development ofdialogue, partnership and cooperation
with the Partner States builds on the principles established in NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted by
Heads ofState and Government in Rome in November 1991. NACC Activities Cooperation on defense-
related issues, in military and peacekeepingfields, including exercises, was originally incorporated into
the NACC Work Plan. This was then subsumed into Partnershipfor Peace activities. " NATO Fact Sheet
No. 1 NATO Online. Available http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fsl.htm
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promoting it. This principle gradually became one of thefundamentals on which NATO's
relations with Central Europe were based.
"20 She emphasized: "The document
specifically recommended developing practical ways of implementing civilian control of
the military.
"21 The document stated:
We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the
Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We
therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and
economic reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by
their peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic
States. We will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them
succeed in this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our
own security is inseparably linked to that ofall other states in Europe. 22
At its January 1994 Summit in Brussels, the Alliance made three important
initiatives.
Thefirst initiative launched the Partnership for Peace Program as a foundation for
intensive cooperation among the armed forces of NATO members, all former Warsaw
Pact countries, and other non-NATO European states that wanted to join this program.23
20 Re'ka Szemerke nyi, p. 64.
21
Ibid., p. 64.
22 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, NATO Press Communique S-l(91)86,8 November
1991, Article 9, NATO Online. Available HTTP: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911108a.htm
23 Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale,
Benefits, Costs and Implications (Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S.
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By providing the practical integration and cooperation of these very different forces, the
PfP has led to the enlargement of NATO membership and supported integration into
Europe. From the one side the PfP initiative indicated a willingness to offer the security
guarantees and obligations ofNATO membership to the former Warsaw Pact states, but
from the other side many initiatives were undertaken within the PfP- program to promote
democratic civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO's decision-
making process also offered a good working example of democratic civilian control over
the armed forces in sixteen nations.
The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the
North Atlantic Council, willforge new security relationships between the
North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace... we will work in
concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting
democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military
exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NA TO forces in such
fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations,
and others as may be agreed.^
To promote democratic civil-military relations NATO initiated several programs
with special emphasis on civil-military relations, together with other organizations such as
the North Atlantic Assembly, universities and independent research institutions. "They
Department of State, February 24, 1997), The U.S. Department of State Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.state.gOv/www/regioiis/eitf/9702nato_report.html#execuUve. Available 3 March 1997.
24
"Declaration of the Heads of State and Government issued by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels,
Belgium," NATO Press Communique M-l(94)3,l 1 January 1994, NATO Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c9401 1 la.htm
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organized seminars and workshops on such practical issues as democratic accountability
and defense budgeting. Thus NA TO began increasing its information activities to help
establish and consolidate democratic civil-military relations in Central and Eastern
European countries. " 25 Indeed, as soon as NATO decided to enlarge, the promotion of
the candidates' civil-military relations gained even greater significance. The Alliance
created several tracks to promote civil-military relations:
• Through the. North Atlantic Cooperation Council numerous seminars and
workshops were organized. Such issues as the conversion of defense industries
and the necessity of democratic transformation of the armed forces were
discussed.
• NATO invited to its schools and academies participants from the other countries.
• Many seminars and workshops for parliamentarians from Central and East
Europe were organized by the North Atlantic Assembly to familiarize them with
approaches to defense budgeting and military overseeing.
• Close military cooperation in peacekeeping operations were promoted through
specific training and exercises.26
At this time one can say that PfP has come a long way in a short time and has
already shown concrete evidence of its potential. It is not just military cooperation, nor
simply a framework for preparing Partner countries for future membership of the Alliance.
Its objectives are much wider and more ambitious: a broader and deeper Euro-Atlantic
relationship with all Partners. Begun as a series of exploratory partnerships between
25 Re'ka Szemerke nyi, p. 66.
26 Allen L. Keiswetter, "The Partnership for Peace and Civil-Military Relations in a Democracy" in
Anton A. Bebler (ed.) yCivil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States. Central and East Europe in
Transition, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997, p. 5.
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NATO and non-NATO countries it has become a web of Partnership activities, which are
increasingly responsive to the individual needs of Partner countries. The Partnership brings
real benefits to NATO and to non-NATO countries, and to the security and stability of
Europe as a whole. PfP promoted democratic approaches in defense policy-making within
NATO itself "by establishing working contacts among officers and soldiers of NA TO
member-states and Partner countries. "21 The PfP objectives include almost all aspects of
democratic civil-military relations:
• transparency in the national defense planning and budgeting processes;
• enduring democratic control of armed forces;
• clear legal and constitutional frameworks;
• chain of command from the military to government through a civilian Minister
of Defense;
• qualified civilians working with the military on defense policy,
requirements and budget;
• a clear division of professional responsibility between civilian and
military personnel;
• effective oversight and review by parliament.28
Partnership for Peace became an instrument for building closer
relationships with our new Partners to the East. Through PfP the East and
the West seek to build the habits of consultation, trust and cooperation.
Much of this cooperation is in the military sphere. At the same time PfP-
countries build common ideas and approaches to peacekeeping and
27 Re'ka Szemerkenyi, p. 67.
28 Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, NATO Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/pfp.htm
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humanitarian support operations. There is, however, more to the
Partnership for Peace than military exercises and activities. We aim to
provide our experience and expertise to the new democracies in creating
democratically organized and accountable Ministries ofDefense. We also
aim to introduce a planning and review process based on the force
planning system that has played a major part in enhancing Alliance
solidarity and underpinning the integrated military structure. 2 **
The US State Department Program of International Military Education and
Training (IMET) is another key component in the promotion of civil-military relations of
post-communist countries. In new political conditions, this program gained even greater
significance. IMET enjoys a legal mandate that permits it to perform a vital role in the
professional education of civilian and military leaders of the PfP states. IMET exposes
students to the US professional military establishment and the American way of life,
including US regard for democratic values and respect for individual and human rights.
Students are also exposed to the manner in which the US military functions under civilian
control and how the military interacts with society. With this purpose IMET has expanded
its role to promote democratic civil-military relations via military education programs. The
specific objectives of these programs are:
1 . To foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian
control of the military;
29 Willy Claes, "NATO and the Evolving Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture," NATO Review,No 1-
January 1995, NATO Online. Available HTTP: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9501-l.htm
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2. To improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with
internationally recognized human rights;
3. To resolve the civil-military conflict that a country actually confronts, and
bring together key military and civilian leaders in order to break down barriers
that often exist between armed forces, civilian officials, and legislators of
competing political parties
4. To modify existing civil-military mechanisms used by democracies to meet a
country's own unique circumstances and help resolve civil-military conflicts. 30
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is also an important
element of the US European Command (USEUCOM) in terms of the promotion of
democratic civil-military relations via military education. "Since its founding, the George
C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen has served as an important bridge
between east and west. " 31
In addition, the Naval Postgraduate School provides an opportunity for students
from the post-communist countries to study in the International Security and Civil-
Military Relations Master's Degree Program. This program provides the student with
an analytical and practical understanding of how civilian officials, legislators, and military
officers can work together to resolve security issues. The program meets the following
related needs:
a) the program gives civilian officials and military officers the skills to resolve
security problems confronting their own democracies;
30 The FY 1998 Security Assistance Budget Request by U.S. Department of State, The DISAMJournal of
International Assistance Management, Vol. 19, No. 3, Spring 1997, p. 38-39.
31 John P. Connell, "Ukraine," The DISAMJournal ofInternational Assistance Management, Vol. 19,
No. 1, Fall 1996, p. 12.
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b) the program prepares its graduates to offer an in-depth understanding of
democratic civil-military relations to others upon returning to their own countries and
organizations, providing a multiplier effect for the initial investment in their education;
c) the program prepares students to help resolve civil-military issues raised by
participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, membership in the Partnership for Peace
and other alliances, and security cooperation among the students' own nations and other
nations, particularly the United States. 32
The second Alliance initiative launched in Brussels in 1994 was "the concept of
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). This concept enables NA TOforces and military
assets to be employed in a moreflexible manner to deal with regional conflicts, crisis
management andpeacekeeping operations. "33
The third important initiative ofNATO embraced in Brussels in December 1994
was the opening of the Alliance to new membership. 34 NATO's leaders stated that
according to Article X of the Washington Treaty, NATO "remained open to membership
for other European states in a position tofurther the principles of the Treaty and to
32 More information about the Civil-Military Relations Curriculum of the NSA Department of the Naval
Postgraduate School may be obtained from The Center for Civil-Military Relations by Internet. Available
HTTP: http://www.pao.nps.navy.mil/ccmr.html
33 Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale,
Benefits, Costs and Implications (Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, February 24, 1997), The U.S. Department of State Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.state.gOv/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html#executive. Available 3 March 1997.
34 According to Article X: "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State
in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic
area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its
instrument of accession with the Government of the United States ofAmerica. The Government of the
United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of
accession. " From The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1997),
NATO Online. Available HTTP: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm
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contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area and that they expected and welcomed
the new membership ofdemocratic states to NA TO's east.^ 5
The Brussels' Communique stated:
Building on the close and long-standingpartnership among the North
American and European Allies, we are committed to enhancing security
and stability in the whole ofEurope... We expect and would welcome
NA TO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as
part ofan evolutionary process, taking into account political and security
developments in the whole ofEurope ,"36
The Brussels' Communique confirmed that the main purpose ofNATO enlargement
is to provide stability and security for the whole of Europe. To reach these purposes
several important political criteria emerged. "The Clinton administration and its NATO
allies, after some initial disagreement, have chosen a gradual and deliberate middle
course and have begun the process. Several key points should be stressed:
• First, the goal remains the defense of the alliance 's vital interests and the
promotion ofEuropean stability. NATO expansion must strengthen security in the
entire region, including nations that are not members. The goal is to promote
35 Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale,
Benefits, Costs and Implications (Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, February 24, 1997), The U.S. Department of State Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.state.gOv/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html#executive. Available 3 March 1997.
36
"Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, 1 December 1994," Press Communique M-NAC-2 (94)
116, NATO Online. Available HTTP: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c941201a.htm
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security in central Europe by integrating countries that qualify into the stabilizing
framework ofNA TO.
• Second, NA TO should no longer be considered an anti-Russian alliance.
• Third, there is no timetable or list of nations that will be invited to join
NA TO. The answers to the critical question of who and when will emerge after
completion of this phase of the process.
• Fourth, each nation will be considered individually, not as part of some
grouping.
• Fifth, the decision as to who joins NA TO and when will be made exclusively
by the alliance. No outside nation will exercise a veto.
• Sixth, although criteria for membership have not been determined, certain
fundamental precepts reflected in the original Washington treaty remain as valid
as they were in 1949: new members must be democratic, have market economies,
be committed to responsible security policies, and be able to contribute to the
alliance.
"37
As President Clinton has stated: "Countries with repressive political systems,
countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by
civilian control or with closed economic systems need not apply "38
37 Richard Holbrook, pp. 45-46.
38 Ibid, p.46.
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• Last, it should be remembered that each new NA TO member constitutes for
the United States the most solemn of all commitments: bilateral defense treaty
that extends the US security umbrella to a new nation. This requires ratification
by two-thirds of the US Senate, a point that advocates of immediate expansion
often overlook"?9
This careful and gradual approach of the western leaders toward NATO enlargement
can be explained by three potential weaknesses among the new members:
First, the alliance may admit states that might revert to a totalitarian regime.
Second, the alliance may admit states that as yet have an imperfect democratic
political control of the armed forces.
Third, new NATO members may have militaries with an insufficient level of
democratic military professionalism so that collaboration in an integrated command
structure will be problematic.40
That is why civil-military relations, effective democratic control of the armed forces,
gained a new significance in the West and must be considered as a fundamental
requirements ofNATO and, as a result, the main criteria of the NATO's membership for
the potential candidates. From my view, one of the most effective frameworks of
democratic civilian control over the military was offered by the U.S. analyst Jeffrey Simon
in four points:
39 Ibid, p. 46.
40 Marybeth P.Ulrich, "Democracy and Russian Military Professionalism," Airpower Journal, Special
Edition 1996, p. 80.
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• A clear division of authority between the president and government
(prime minister and defense minister) in Constitutions, Amendments,
or through Public Law. The Law should clearly establish who
commands and controls the military and promotes senior military
officers in peacetime, who holds emergency powers in crisis, and who
has authorityfor the transition to war.
• Parliamentary oversight of the military through control of the defense budget.
Its role in deploying armedforces in emergency and war must be clear.
• Peacetime government control of general staffs and military commanders
through civilian defense ministries. Control should include preparation of the
defense budget, access to intelligence, involvement in strategic planning,
force structure development, arms acquisitions and deployments, and military
promotions.
• Restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and accountability for the
armedforces to be effective. Having come from the communist period when
the military was often used as an instrument of external or internal
oppression, society must perceive the military as being under effective
national control. Military training levels and equipment must also be
sufficient to protect the state. 41
41 For more information see Jeffrey Simon, "NATO Enlargement," National Defense University, INSS,
Strategic Forum, No. 31(May 1995), p. 2.
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The U.S. policy in "The 1994 National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement" was also a vital document outlining the new significance of civil-military
relations. On the criteria for candidate countries to join, the Strategy mentions
'democracy, prosperity and security cooperation ' among Partner countries.42
B. WESTERN CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN
CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES
The notion of democratic control is widely understood as meaning that armed
forces are clearly subordinate and accountable to democratically elected authorities and
that they do not constitute an autonomous entity capable of exercising excessive influence
over policy. Chris Donnelly, NATO's special adviser for Central and East European
Affairs, offers clarification to such an important notion as democratic control According
to him: "Democratic control encompasses government direction of military activity and
parliamentary oversight of both government and the military (the English word "control"
is often inadequately translated in this respect)."43
At the same time, no single formula or model exists for democratic control.
Alliance countries share a broad range of approaches that do not respond to a single set of
criteria. A number of elements can be identified as being important for the achievement of
democratic control. Rudolf Joo, Hungarian policy maker and scholar, argues: "In Western
countries there is no single solution to the problem ofdemocratic control of the military:
42 See "A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement" (Washington DC: The White
House, 1994) pp. 21-23, and Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, p. 68.
43 Chris Donnelly, "Defense Transformation in the New Democracies: a Framework for Tacking the
Problem," NATO Review, January 1997, p. 17.
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the legal and political arrangements vary widely. Civil-military relations therefore differ
from country to country: the role of the military in France is not like that in Belgium, the
Spanish military is not the same as the Danish military, etc. "44 For example, a clear
constitutional and legal framework, a civilianized Ministry of Defense, and effective
parliamentary oversight are essential elements of democratic control of the military.
However, for each element there is inevitably a qualification and differences of detail when
applied to Alliance members. The absence of a single model means that assessing the
adequacy of democratic control is troublesome. At the same time, while there are many
political institutions and societal conditions that are similar or identical in most Western
democracies, and that support the shared principle of civilian direction of the army, several
essential requirements (societal, procedural and institutional) constitute the democratic
model of civilian control of the armed forces.
They are:
• the existence of a clear legal and constitutional framework, defining
the basic relationship between the state and armedforces. On the one
hand, this provides an important prerequisite of the functioning of the
rule of law; on the other, it reduces the risks of uncertain
jurisdictional claims, which can give rise to tension among separate
parts of the political authority as well as between the political and
military establishments;
44 Rudolf Joo, "The democratic control of armed forces. The experience of Hungary," Chaillot Paper No.
23; Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, Paris-February 1996, p. 7.
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• the significant role ofparliament in legislating on defense and security
matters, in influencing the formulation of national strategy, in
contributing transparency to decisions concerning defense and
security policy, in giving budget approval and in controlling spending
using 'the power of the purse' in issues related to 'the power of the
sword';
• the hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government
through a civilian organ of public administration - a ministry or
department of defense - that is charged, as a general rule, with the
direction/supervision of its activity. In most of the liberal democracies
the central organization of defense is headed by an elected civilian
politician, who is assisted by a number of qualified civilians (civil
servants, political appointees, advisers etc.), who work together with
military officers in carrying out strategic planning and coordination
tasks;
• the presence of a well trained and experienced professional military
corps that is respected and funded by a civilian authority. It
acknowledges the principle of civilian control, including the principle
ofpolitical neutrality and non-partisanship of the armedforces;
• the civilian and uniformed defense authorities divide their
responsibilities in such a way that political authority and
28
accountability on the one hand, and military professionalism and
expertise on the other, are maximized;
• the existence of a developed civil society, with a long-standing
practice and tradition of democratic institutions and values that is
able to resolve societal conflicts in an effective and efficient manner,
and, as a part of the political culture, a nationwide consensus on the
role and mission of the military;4 '*
The priority for Central European policy-makers in the initial stage of reform for
NATO membership was to establish the democratic institutions of civilian control. Their
policies were driven by Western ideas and models from the very beginning of the transition
process. Central European policy-makers studied various Western institutions; however,
ambiguous information about the numerous different approaches can confuse even
experienced researchers. From my view, the pillars of the western system, first and
foremost, of the United States model of democratic civilian control of the armed forces
rely on two main principles: democratic political control and democratic military
professionalism
.
These principles have to be considered not only to understand the democratic model
of civil-military relations as a whole, but also as an excellent example of the unique
framework and approach. The United States distinguishes itself by a successful
45 Ibid, p. 7.
29
development over two centuries-marked by an absence military coups and arbitrary
military rule throughout. This record forms the best evidences of such effective policy.
Democratic political control includes certain criteria that govern civil-military
relations. These parameters were summarized by Louis Smith and David F. Trask, leading
scholars of American civil-military relations.
They include:
1. Civilian leadership ofthe executive branch ofgovernment
The national leadership is accountable to a popular majority through frequent
and regular elections. Also, the chief executive may be removed by the exercise
of well-established constitutional processes. For example, the Congress of the
United States may discharge presidentsfrom office, if they commit "high crimes
and misdemeanors . 46
2. Civilian leadership oftheprofessional military services and departments.
The professional military heads of the army, the navy and the air force are
subordinate to civilian departmental heads. The chief executive appoints them,
and the national legislature confirms them. In other words, the civilian stands
at the head of the military chain of command, supported by civilian
subordinates who oversee the day-to-day activities of the armedforces. 41
46 David F. Trask, "Democracy and Defense. Civilian Control ofthe Military in the United States,




Most important for the democratic civilian control of the military is Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States: the president is the Commander in
Chief of the armed forces. This dual role is quite important for the civilian control. Thus,
as a chief executive and commander in chief the president heads both the executive branch
of government and the military services with the powers that include appointment of
officers of the armed forces. Through his command authority, he provides for civilian
control over the making of military policy.
Consequently, clear legal and constitutional provisions that define the basic
relationship between the state and the armed forces are absolutely necessary for
democratic society. This element of civilian control not only guards against military coups
and arbitrary military rule but it also recognizes the military is a servant of national
political goals established by the civilian government.
3. Statutory provisions to establishfundamental national security policies.
Elected legislative representatives ofthe people enact laws that define the defense
organization andpolicies of the nation. 4*
According to the Constitution of the United States, the congress passes legislation
that defines the scope of military activity and provides basic guidelines. The president, as a
chief executive, enforces legislative directives.




The judiciary prevents the military from compromising civil liberties, including
those ofmembers of the armed services. In the United States, the Supreme Court
is empowered to hear cases that involve military infringements on the right of the
citizenry. 49
5. Separation ofpowers.
The division of the responsibilities of the central government among the executive,
legislative andjudicial branches. 50
This structural device directly affects civil-military relations. For example, despite
the predominant role of the executive branch of government in civilian control, the
legislative branch has an effective influence in military affairs, reflecting the principle of
separation of powers. According to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United
States "The congress shall have power to...provide for the common Defense... of the
United States. "51
The most important among the powers are: "To declare War, " "To raise and
support Armies to that Use shall be for a longer term than two Years, " and "To provide
and maintain a Navy. "52 Consequently, the legislative branch has significant power in
defense and security matters, including control over the budget.





51 Ibid, p. 10.
52 Ibid., p. 10.
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The allocation ofpower among the different branches of the government of the
government such that each is protected against the others-and the people against
all-by requiring the approval by one branch of certain decisions made by the
others. 5^
In addition, democratic political control is enhanced when the military is given a
stable, legitimate, institutionalized status within the state. 54
In other words, the democratic state has to assign to the military a credible and
honorable role in the defense of the state and of the accomplishment of national goals
where appropriate. Furthermore, the state must prevent civilian politicians and militaries
from misusing the military's monopoly of force to attain political goals. Consequently, the
military professional must remain politically neutral, non-partisan and depoliticized.
As Rudolf Joo emphasized: " Being neutral and non-partisan, the military officer
can serve several successive governments. He serves the state, and the duly constituted
(elected or appointed) state authority, and not just one segment of the political
establishment. In this respect, his position is very similar to that of civil servants in a
pluralistic regime. " 55
The ideal of democratic military professionalism was described by the
prominent political scientist Samuel P. Huntington. He has argued that a modern
professional military can be characterized by:
53 Ibid., p. 9.
54 Constantine P. Danopolous and Daniel Zirker, "Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav
Successor States, " (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. xiv.
55 Joo, p. 21.
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a) its experience in the management of the state's instrument of violence;
b) a sense of corporateness and responsibility to society among its members;
c) a "realistic" and "conservative" military ethic. 56
Historian David F. Trask mentioned that military professionalism emerged during
the last years of the 1 9th century. From that time until now the United States military
became professionalized. This development had two outcomes:
First, the military constitutes a profession whose membership is
determined on the basis of achievement. In the United States military
officers constitute neither a class nor a caste. Mandatory retirement
further undermines any basis for the development of class or caste
identifications.
Second, institutions founded to provide training and education to the
officer corps, such as the military academies, the command and staff
colleges, and the senior war colleges, seek to inculcate the value of
professionalism in those they train. Professionalism requires of each
officer a commitment to professional excellence-the observance of the
highest technical standards in meeting the requirements of his or her
chosen field. This generally excludes concern with political, economic or
56 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics ofCivil-Military
Relations, " New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1964., pp. 8-18 and pp. 59-79. The summary of the notions
"realistic" and "conservative" is on page 79. For more information see also Russel F. Weigley, "Towards
an American Army. Military Thought from Washington to Marshall," Columbia University Press, 1962,
pp. 1-78.
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civil matters that fall outside the narrow purview of the military
profession. 57
Hence, according to Trask's definition, democratic military professionalism includes
the commitment to civilian control of the armed forces. From the view of this author,
effective professionalism for external defense is the cardinal expectation which each
society must have of its armed forces.
C. CONCLUSIONS:
1. To promote democracy in central and eastern Europe, the North Atlantic
Alliance created several important criteria for states that desire to join NATO. New
members must:
a) be democratic;
b) have market economies;
c) be committed to responsible security policies;
d) be able to contribute to the alliance.
Countries with repressive political systems, countries with territorial designs on
their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control or with closed
economic systems need not apply.
2. Partnership for Peace became an instrument for building closer relationships
with Partners to the East. On the one hand, the Partnership for Peace initiative indicated a
willingness to offer the security guarantees and obligations of NATO membership to the
former Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, however, many initiatives were undertaken
57 Trask, pp. 27-29.
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within the PfP program to promote civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe.
The PfP encourages democratic standards in defense policy-making within NATO itself by
establishing working contacts among officers and soldiers of NATO member-states and
Partner countries. Prominent among the objectives of PfP are practically all aspects of
democratic civil-military relations:
a) facilitating transparency in the national defense planning and budgeting
processes;
b) establishing enduring democratic control of armed forces;
c) clear legal and Constitutional frameworks;
d) chain of command from the military to government through a civilian Minister of
Defense;
e) qualified civilians working with the military on defense policy;
f) requirements and budget;
g) a clear division of professional responsibility between civilian and military
personnel;
h) effective oversight and scrutiny by parliament.
3. Western support for establishing democratic civilian control of the military is
gaining strategic importance because of the Communist Party's long-standing influence
over the military.
4. There is no single solution to the problem of democratic control of the military:
the legal and political arrangements vary widely. Civil-military relations therefore differ
from country to country and within NATO as a whole. This fact is indeed a source of
strength.
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5. Despite the absence of the single solution to solve such important problem as
democratic control of the armed forces, there are at least two important political
conceptions that serve as a pillars for the frameworks of the democratic control of the
military in the western democratic societies.
They are:
1. Democratic political control by means of a separation of powers.




ffl. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER A SOVIET COMMUNIST
REGIME: POINT OF DEPARTURE
A. THE NATURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER
COMMUNIST REGIMES
Under communism, the armed forces of the Communist states of Europe were
under the control not only of their own communist parties but also of the communist party
of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and the High Command of the Warsaw Pact
Organization. Soviet influence over Eastern Europe began with the Soviet liberation of
territories during World War II. By 1948 communist regimes had come to power in all the
East European states. Soviet military power played a decisive role in the creation of the
communist states in Eastern Europe. A former Polish Communist leader, Wladyslaw
Gomulka, underlined that the transformation of Polish society started without revolution
because of the presence of the Red Army. 58 The Soviet Union exercised control over the
East European states through political, economic and military mechanisms. Thus, to
understand the nature of civil-military relations in the East European states one has to take
into account the domination of civil-military relations by the Soviet-communist political
system in general, because the structure and functions of the Party and the Governments in
the East European states were very similar to those in the Soviet Union. 59
58 Speech of Dec. 7, 1945, in A. Ross Johnson, The Transformation ofCommunist Ideology: The
Yugoslav Case, 1945-1953 (Cambridge, Mass: MJT Press, 1972), p. 14.
59 Andzej Korbonski and Sarah M. Terry outline four distinct stages in the evolution of Poland's civil-
military relations under the influence of Soviet military-political system. They are: 1) co-optation of the
Polish military into the communist party structures; 2) political subordination of the armed forces to the
communist party; 3) accommodation between Polish military and communist party; 4) participation in
managing of the country. See Andrzej Korbonski and Sarah M. Terry, "The Military as a Political Actor
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Under communist regimes, all society's institutions including the armed forces
were dominated by one political authority. This entity had no legitimacy in the eyes of the
majority of the public. "The leading organs of the Party-the Political Bureau and the
Central Committee-were not democratically elected... The whole political environment in
the Communist countries lacked transparency, political responsibility and accountability.
The notion of constitutional checks and balances was altogether missing from these
regimes. " 60
Consequently, the Communist Party's control over the armed forces was not truly
democratic because its institutions lacked the basic requirements of democratic control
and accountability. Furthermore, the armed forces of communist countries were highly
politicized because they, like the police and counterintelligence, were instruments of
communist party's political power. As pillars of the regime, "the military was not only
part of the system, but also it become one of the guardians of the system, both on the
domestic (national) and international (Warsaw Pact) level. " 61 . That is why the
maintenance of military loyalty through the party's control and supervision of the armed
forces was the major policy goal under a communist regime. Thus, Communist Party
control represented something quite different from a genuine democratic control in the
in Poland," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats:
Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), p.
160.
60 Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The Experience of Hungary," Chaillot Paper
No 23; Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, Paris-February 1996, p. 12.
61 Rudolf Joo, p. 13.
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Western democracies.62 One should recall that democratic structures of civil-military
relations in the countries with stable political systems and open civil society assume the
following important criteria:
First of all, the existence ofa constitution or basic law clearly defining:
• the relationship between president, government, parliament, and the
military;
• the checks and balances applying to this relationship, including the
role of thejudiciary;
• who commands the military;
• who promotes military personnel;
• who holds emergencypowers in a crisis;
• where the authority liesfor the transitionfrom peace to war.
Second, there should be political oversight of the military. This should be
done in two ways: by means ofdemocratic political control over the General Staff
through the defense ministry-which includes a civilian component-and which itself
is subject to parliamentary control, especially concerning the defense budget.
Third, the military should maintain adequate levels of training and
equipment order to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the
state, but also to prevent demoralization and Bonapartism within the army. " 63
62 Chris Donnelly, "Military-Civil Relations in Post-Communist Systems: Common Problems," in K.
Skogan (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in the post-Communist states in Eastern and Central Europe,
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1993, pp. 7-8.
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The one-party system is monopolistic and hierarchical. At first sight, its structure
seems to be relatively simple, but in reality, there are no clear divisions between different
political institutions. Hence, it is difficult to understand and differentiate the interests of
the varying political groups and their leaders involved in the decision-making process. This
reality is one of the reasons why it is difficult to define Communist party leadership as a
genuine civilian control. 64 Instead of genuine civilian leadership, the armed forces and
their leaders were completely controlled by the Nomenklatura system of communist
parties. 65 In such conditions, "it was a really big problem to identify where the Army
responsibility ended, and where the Communist Party authority began. " 66
6
^ Willem V. Eekellen, "The Security Dimensions ofEuropean Integration and the Central-East
European States" in Anton A. Bebler (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States
.Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, ( Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), p. 9.
64 Rudolf Joo, p. 13.
65 Nomenklatura system "was developed in the Soviet Union and spread to all communist regimes. This
system was a tool which the Party used to control appointments to senior position within all structures of
Soviet society. This means that ...at every level ofgovernment, a list ofkey posts (called the
Nomenklatura) and a list ofpeople approved by the Partyfor holding office at a given level of
responsibility are drawn up. This group ofapprovedpersonnel is called the 'cadres ' The Party committee
at each level must approve the nomination ofany new incumbent and regularly confirm the retention in
office ofthe current holder. The more important the job, the higher the level ofParty organization that
controls the Nomenklatura and list ofcadres. For example, the appointment ofthe editor ofa local paper
will be the responsibility ofthe local town or regional Party committee. The appointment ofthe editor of
Pravda was made by the Politburo. Within the USSR 's Ministry ofDefense the post ofHead ofCadres is
a key position. The incumbent is responsiblefor maintaining the military list ofcadresfor appointment,
with Party approval, to key army posts at all levels. In other words, no matter how good someone is at his
or her professionaljob-as administrator, army officer or whatever-he or she will not be consideredfor
appointment without the party 's endorsement as well, that is, unless he or she is prepared to follow the
approved Party line and accept Party guidance on all matters ofsignificance. The system results in the
erosion or destruction ofinstitutional loyalty and independence, and ensures more effective and complete
Communist Party control. " Christopher Donelly, "Red Banner: the Soviet Military System in Peace and
War," Coulsdon, Surrey: Janes 's Information Group, 1988, pp. 99-100.
66 Rudolf Joo, p. 15.
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B. MAIN DIRECTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S
LEADERSHIP OF THE DEFENSE OF THE COMMUNIST STATES
Communist Party leadership over the armed forces was undemocratic but no less
real, and in most cases it was quite effective. 67 The Party developed and defined military
doctrine, policy and strategy.
The leadership of the Communist Party is expressed first and foremost in the
Party's formulation of the state military policy on the basis of which the people and army
act to ensure the country's security. Military policy defined the political aims of the state,
evaluated the international environment and the military potentials of probable adversaries,
and established guidelines for Communist military involvement in the world. It both
overlapped with and supported foreign policy of Communist's countries. Military policy
took into account the economic, social, scientific, and specifically military capabilities of
the Communist state and was used by the party to determine the optimal directions for
structuring the armed forces and for strengthening the economic-technical base of the
state's defense. Concerned about the integrity and security of the state, the party could
modify its military policy as the interests of the state changed.68
Soviet military policy was a political basis for Soviet military doctrine and
depended on the following factors:
67 Rudolf Joo, p. 15.
68 In the former Soviet Union, Soviet military policy was an element of Party's policy, and the
Communist Party directed military policy like all other elements of Soviet policy. Soviet military policy
included the planning and manufacture of arms, the training of military personnel, military research,
various mobilization measures, the formation of defensive alliances, the diplomatic practice, etc. All are
determined by that policy. For more information see William T. Lee, "Soviet Perceptions of the Threat
and Soviet Military Capabilities" in Foundations ofForce Planning. Concepts and Issues, Naval War
College Press, Newport, R.I., 1986., pp 142-143.
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a) the economic potential-the level of economic development and of science and
technology;
b) the social potential-the relative strength of the combatant 's socio-political
structures;
c) the moral-political potential-the ideological and moral spirit of the national
populations;
d) the military and combat potential-the relative fighting power of the
opponents.
"69
Military doctrine was the party line on military affairs. It defined the potential
adversaries, the nature of future wars, the force requirements, the general direction of
military development, the preparation of the country for war, and even the type of
weapons needed to fight a war. 70 The party's military policy defined the political aims of
the Communist state and proposed concrete measures to develop and strengthen the
state's military might by improving the organization and the armaments of the armed
forces. 71
Marshal Grechko, former Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, emphasized
that military doctrine, at least, answers the questions:
1 ) What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war ?
69 Christopher Donelly, "Red Banner: the Soviet Military System in Peace and War," Coulsdon, Surrey:




^ Military doctrine (Voennaya Doktrina) "A nation 's officially accepted system ofscientifically
founded views on the nature ofmodern wars and the use ofarmedforces in them, and also on the
requirements arisingfrom this view regarding the country and its armedforces being made readyfor war.
Military doctrine has two aspects: political and military-technical. The basis tenets ofa military doctrine
are determined by a nation 's political and military leadership according to the socio-political order, the
country 's level ofeconomic, scientific and technological development, and the armedforce 's combat
material, with due to regard to the conclusions ofmilitary science and the views ofthe probable enemy.
"
Dictionary ofBasic and Military Terms (A Soviet View) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the
U.S. Air Force (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 37.
44
2) What is the character of the war in which the state and its armed forces will
have to take part; what goals and missions might they be faced with in this war?
3) What armed forces are needed to execute the assigned missions, and in what
direction must military development be carried out?
4) How are preparations for war to be implemented?
5) What methods must be used to wage war?72
In the West, the 'military doctrine" embraces tactical principles or operational art
and regulations. It usually amounts to a set of guidelines for the tactical commander. It
may also contain a list of principles to act as a basis for decisions and to stimulate original
and creative thought. In the United States, military doctrine is a flexible word. There are
doctrines for the U.S. Armed Forces: Army doctrine and Air Force doctrine, for
instance. 73 In contrast, "in the former Soviet Union, there was only one military
doctrine: the official Soviet military doctrine.
"74 Soviet military doctrine was a close
equivalent, in terms of content, to the national security policy in the United States. Soviet
military doctrine was the policy of the Party-State worked out by the political leadership.
It described the nature of future war, the methods for waging it, and the preparations and
organization not only for different branches of the armed forces, but also for the entire
armed forces and the nation as a whole. To clarify this thought one should underline that
Soviet military doctrine was drawn up with the participation of key political, party and
military leaders and officially approved by the Central Committee of the Communist
72 See John J. Dziak, "The Institutional Foundations of Soviet Military Doctrine" in Graham D. Vernon
ed., Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace, National Defense University Press, 1981, p. 6.




Party. 75 Only after official approval did it become an official political-military document
and was used in preparing the country for war. 76
Military doctrine had military-political and military-technical components.
Marxist-Leninist teaching shaped the military-political component of doctrine, which
defined the party's overriding military-political goals and was by far the more important of
the two components. Raymond L. GarthofT, a retired Foreign Service officer and a former
Ambassador, argues that western commentators often mistake the political level as "a
concept they do not use, as being merely declamatory doctrine, or propaganda, or even
disinformation. But the political level of Soviet military doctrine is not merely
pronouncements, much less merely propaganda, any more than Soviet political and
ideological doctrine is propaganda without policy relevance. Authoritative Soviet
accounts describe the socio-political level of military doctrine as determining the
military-technical one "J1
Indeed, Soviet theorists claimed that the military-political component is more
decisive in the formulation of military doctrine The political-military component is shaped
by political and economic strategies of the Communist Party, and to some extent, by the




Ibid., p. 9, and also Harriet F. Scott, "The Making of Soviet Military Doctrine" (Paper prepared for
CFIA-PSIA-RRC Seminar at Harvard University, March 13, 1978).
77 Raymond L. GarthofT, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," The Washington Quarterly,
Summer 1988, p. 132.
78
"Military Doctrine," 'Voyennyi entsiklopedicheski slovar' (The Military Encyclopedic Dictionary,
Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1983; 2d ed., 1986), p.240. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the former Chief of General
Staff of the USSR's armed forces, then editor of the first edition.
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definition of military-political component of Soviet military doctrine made by former
Commandant of the Soviet Academy of the General Staff Army General S. Ivanov. He
said: "The political principles include the propositions revealing the sociopolitical
essence ofwar which the imperialists can unleash upon the Soviet Union, the character
of the political objectives and the strategic tasks of the state in it, and their influence on
the construction of the armedforces and the method ofpreparingfor and waging war.
"79
The military-technical component of the military doctrine was affected by lead
times and refinements in weapon systems, as well as a broad reading of the view of the
probable enemy. It deals with the methods of waging war, the organization of the armed
forces, their technical equipment and their combat readiness. 80
To clarify the distinction between Soviet military policy and Soviet military
doctrine, one must underscore that Soviet military policy was much broader than merely
doctrine. Whereas doctrine contained the guiding principles on the essence of future wars
and on the methods and weapons for fighting them, Soviet military policy guided the
development and strengthening of the state's military might through improving the
79 Army General S. Ivanov, " Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy", Voyennaya mysl, No. 5, May 1969,
FPD 01 17/69, 18 December 1969 in Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber (eds.), Selected
Readingsfrom Military Thought; 1963-1973., Studies in Communist Affairs, Government Printing Office,
Washington DC, 1982, Vol. 5, Part II. p. 24.
°° Army General S. Ivanov said: "The military-technical principles ofthe doctrine encompass questions
oforganization, training, and employment ofthe armedforces in war, determine the major trendsfor the
combat employment, the technical equipping, and the organizational structure ofthe ofthe armedforces;
the development ofthe military art, and the requirementsfor the combat training oftroops and their
combat readiness. This aspect ofmilitary doctrine is much more dynamic when compared with its
political aspect. " Army General S. Ivanov, " Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," Voyennaya mysl,
No. 5, May 1969, FPD 0117/69, 18 December 1969 in Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber
(eds.), Selected Readingsfrom Military Thought; 1963-1973., Studies in Communist Affairs, Government
Printing Office, Washington DC, 1982, Vol. 5, Part II. p. 24.
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organization and armaments of the armed forces so that they could be used successfully to
achieve the state's political goals. Thus, Soviet military doctrine was based on Soviet
military policy. 81
To understand why the military-political component was more decisive in the
formulation of Soviet military doctrine one should take into account the ideological nature
of civil-military relations under communism "Soviet military doctrine is a class doctrine.
It expresses the interests of our people, who are building a communist society, and is
directed at the defense of the socialist homelandfrom imperialist aggression. Together
with this in it are expressed the international obligations of the Soviet nation and its
armedforces. "82
Soviet military strategy was subordinated to doctrine. The military doctrine of
the Soviet Union was the overall policy in principle. Using military doctrine as a starting
point, Soviet military strategists amplified and investigated concrete problems regarding
the nature of future war, the methods of warfare, and the organization and preparation of
the armed forces for war. 83
81 Major General S. Kozlov, a prominent Soviet officer, underlined: "present-day military doctrine is the
political policy ofparty...an expression ofstate military policy, a directive ofpolitical strategy". See The
Officer's Handbook (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971), trans., U.S. Air Force ( Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 63.
82 Army General S. Ivanov, pp. 24-25.
83 Military strategy (Strategiya voyennaya) "The highest level in the field ofmilitary art, constituting a
system ofscientific knowledge concerning the phenomena and laws ofarmed conflict. On the basis ofthe
tenets ofmilitary doctrine, the experience ofpast wars, and analysis ofthe political, economic and
military conditions ofthe current situation, military strategy investigates and elaborates on problems
pertaining to the training ofthe armedforces as a whole and the individual Services, and their strategic
use in war; theforms and methods ofconducting and directing war; and also problems pertaining to
comprehensive strategic support ofthe combat operations ofthe armedforces. At the same time, military
strategy is afield ofpractical activityfor the higher military command and training ofthe armedforces
for war and providing leadership in armed conflict. Military strategy exerts an influence on the
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Soviet military strategy was also closely linked to Soviet military policy. Policy
defined the objectives of war and focused the attention of strategy on the tasks to be
performed. Strategy's dependence on policy increased with the acquisition of nuclear
weapons, the use of which was controlled by the political leadership. Under communism
even military strategy reflected the high degree of politicization of the Soviet armed
forces. This phenomenon can be explained by ideological nature of Soviet military
thinking. Historically, Soviet military thought was based on the Clausewitzean-Leninist
dictum that politics drives all and that war is an extension of politics. Lenin mentioned that
"all wars are inseparablefrom the political systems which engender them.
"84 Lenin took
Clausewitz's political-military conceptions and adapted them to Communist Party military
policy. Prominent Soviet Marshal V.D. Sokolovski restated this theme. 85 He said: "The
acceptance of war as a tool of politics determines the relation of military strategy to
politics;... the subordination of military strategy to state policy determines not only the
nature of strategic aims, but also the general nature of strategy. For instance, the policy
preparation ofa countryfor war in such a way as to ensure victory. " Dictionary ofBasic and Military
Terms (A Soviet View) (Moscov: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 215.
84 Lenin's comments and notes can be found in Donald E. Davis and Walter S. G. Kohn, " Lenin's
Notebook on Clausewitz," in David R. Jones, ed., SovietArmed Forces Review Annual, Vol. 1 (Gulf
Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1977), pp. 188-299.
85 Sokolovski, Vasilii Danilovich (7.21.1897-5.10.1968) "Born at Kozliki, near Grodno. Son ofa
peasant. Joined the RedArmy, 1918. Took part in the Civil War as a regimental commander, brigade
commander, and divisional chief-of-staff Graduatedfrom the MilitaryAcademy ofthe RedArmy, 1921.
Deputy Chiefofthe General Staff, Feb. 1941. During World War II, gainedprominence as Commander
ofthe Western front, 1943-44, and Deputy Commander ofthe 1st Belorussian front, Apr. 1945.
Commander ofSoviet Forces in Germany, 1946-49, and 1st Deputy Minister ofDefense, 1949. Chiefof
General Staff, 1952-60. Member ofthe Central Committee ofthe CPSU, 1952-61, and candidate in a
member ofthe Politburo ofthe CPSU. Died in Moscow. Buried at the Kremlin wall. "A Biographical
Dictionary ofthe Soviet Union 1917-1988, by Jeanne Vronskaya with Vladimir Chuglev, Printed in Great
Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd Chippenham Wiltshire, 1989, p. 410.
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of imperialism, an outmoded social structure, consists of desire to forestall its inevitable
downfall and to prevent the rational development of the world toward socialism .
"86
Finally one can conclude that the origins of Soviet military doctrine and Soviet
military strategy relied upon the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) and the theoretical heritage of Marxism-Leninism. Army General S. Ivanov
underlined: "The sources, the ideological and methodological basis of Soviet military
doctrine and strategy, are there: Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army;
Leninist principles on the defense of the socialist homeland which serve as a basis of
CPSU and Soviet government policy in the resolution of all tasks of military
organization; economic, moral, and scientific-technical capabilities of the state; data of
military science and materialist dialectics which scientifically substantiate the character
ofwar andpreparationfor waging it successfully in a specifically military respect.
"87
C. SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
Soviet military power in Eastern Europe was a principal instrument of Soviet
policy after World War II. It was the ultimate guarantor of East European policies and
political regimes acceptable to the USSR. This generalization can be confirmed by some
historical events. In Hungary, anti-Soviet riots broke out in October 1956 and escalated
86 From Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts, edited by Marshal V.D. Sokovovsky, Chapter
1: "General Concepts," in Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. USA, Retired, ed., Military Strategy: Theory and
Application, United States Army War College, 1989, pp. 410-411.
87 Army General S. Ivanov, " Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," Voyennaya mysl, No. 5, May 1969,
FPD 01 17/69, 18 December 1969 in Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber ed., Selected
Readingsfrom Military Thought; 1963-1973., Studies in Communist Affairs, Government Printing Office,
Washington DC, 1982, Vol. 5, Part II. p. 18.
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immediately to full-scale revolt, with the Hungarians calling for full independence, the
disbanding of the communist party, and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. 88 The Soviet
Union invaded Hungary on November 4, 1956, and Hungarian prime minister Imre Nagy
was arrested and later executed. The events of the 1950s taught the Soviet Union a lesson
that Soviet military power and occupation forces were the main guarantees of the
continued existence of East European communism. Czechoslovakia's 1968 liberalization,
or "Prague Spring," led to a Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968, illustrating that even
gradual reforms were intolerable at that time to the Soviet Union. 89 The invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 was in effect an act of war in which all the members of the Pact,
except Romania, took part.
The so-called Brezhnev doctrine was subsequently invoked in an attempt to
legitimize this unprovoked aggression, claiming that "the sovereignty of individual
socialist countries cannot be counterpoised to the interests ofworld socialism.
"90 After
invasion of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968 Leonid Brezhnev,
former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, told the
Czechoslovak leaders: "Your country is the region occupied by Soviet soldiers in World
War II. We paidfor this with great sacrifices and we will never leave. Your borders are
our borders. You do not follow our suggestions, and we feel threatened...we are
88 See Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution," Journal ofPolitics 20. 1 (February
1958); Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford,
CA, 1961); Miklos Molnar, Budapest, 1956: A History ofthe Hungarian Revolution (London, 1971);
United Nations Report ofthe Special Committee on the Problem ofHungary (New York, 1957).
89 See Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Policy toward Hungary and Czechoslovakia," in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry,
Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 95-105.
90 See Pravda, 25 September 1968.
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completely justified in sending our soldiers to your country in order to be secure within
our borders. It is a secondary matter whether or not there is an immediate threat from
anyone; this is an issue of principle, which will hold, [as it has] since World War II,
forever.
"91 After the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, which ended
a process of liberalization begun by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet
Union made clear the irreversibility of communism in Eastern Europe. 92 The invasion in
Czechoslovakia considerably affected the multilateral and bilateral relationships within the
Warsaw bloc. The Soviet Union demonstrated its ability to mobilize its allies to use
91 A. Ross Johnson, "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe," in Sarah
Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, Yale University Press, 1984., p. 256.
Brezhnev Doctrine "A doctrine developed by Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership that
declares that the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist states are committed to defend, byforce of
arms ifnecessary, the integrity ofthe socialist system whenever and wherever it is threatened. The
Brezhnev Doctrine was developed and invoked in 1968 as an after-the-fact rationale to justify the Soviet-
led invasion and occupation ofCzechoslovakia by troops ofthe Warsaw Treaty Organization. Like the
Monroe Doctrine, the Brezhnev Doctrine was a policy expounded by a major state that seeks to maintain
a degree ofhegemony within its regional sphere ofinfluence. Leonid Brezhnev presented it as part ofthe
doctrine of "social internationalism", which enunciates the principles ofsolidarity and unity among
socialist nations. For Brezhnev, all socialist states have responsibility to protect andpreserve socialism,
byforce ofarms ifnecessary. The Brezhnev Doctrine clearly limited the sovereignty ofEast European
states. It was a continuation ofthe Soviet policy carried on since the end of World War II that held that
the Soviet Union must unilaterally determine what policies and actions are politically acceptable in bloc
states. Brezhnevjustified this view by holding that countries like Czechoslovakia can maintain their
sovereignty only under conditions ofsocialism. Thus, Soviet intervention in a socialist state was a
domestic rather than aforeign matter, and Western criticism ofviolations ofsovereignty was rejected
outright. The Brezhnev Doctrine emphasized the priorities ofthe Soviet leadership. In 1979, the Doctrine
was given new meaning with the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan and the application ofthe principle of
"socialist solidarity " to a non-bloc country. The potential threat ofintervention that characterized the
Brezhnev Doctrine was apparent in Poland during the early 1980s when many observersfeared that the
Soviets would intervene militarily to suppress the independent trade union Solidarity. " Barbara P.
McCrea, Jack C. Piano, George Klein, "The Soviet and East European Political Dictionary," ABC-Clio,
Inc., 1984, pp. 311-312.
92 For more information about the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact see: Gordon H.
Skilling, Czechoslovakia 's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton, NJ., 1976).; Eduard J. Czerwinski and
Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz, eds. The Soviet Invasion ofCzechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe (New
York, 1972); Ivan Svitak, The Czech Experiment, 1968-1969 (New York, 1971); Jiri Valenta, Soviet
Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy ofa Decision (Baltimore, MD, 1979); Pavel Tigrit, Why
Dubcek Fell (London, 1971).
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military force and to impose obedience on a deviant client-state. 93 In the military field,
Soviet aims had been to ensure the controlled development of the East European national
armies. To reach this political aim the armed forces of the East European countries had to
be modified and integrated to conform with the Soviet model with respect to:
• doctrine-all armies had to conform in general to Soviet organizational models
and Soviet tactical and operationalpractices;
• equipment-both the means ofproduction of weapons and equipment and the
major items ofequipment had to be standardized on Soviet lines;
• the role each national army wouldplay in any concerted Pact action 94
Adherence to these principles made it possible for the Soviet Union to use the
military industrial complex and the armed forces of the East European countries and also
to integrate their forces very easily with the Soviet armed forces in case of WTO joint
military exercises. In order to ensure the conformity of Warsaw Pact and Soviet practices,
officers ofWTO countries were required to attend the Soviet military institutes, academies
and General Staff Academy Courses. This requirement gave to the Soviet side a good
opportunity not only to assess the command style but also to make sure of the competence
and reliability of their allies. 95
93 Soviet theorist Colonel Timorin argued that socialists armies exist not only to defend socialism against
its external enemies, but against its internal enemy as well. He stressed: " The internalfunction ofa
socialist army has three aspects: 1) as a psychological deterrent against anti-socialistforces; 2) as a
backup for internal securityforces; 3) as a combatforce in those cases when the opposition ofthe
enemies ofsocialism within a country acquires significant scale, intensity, duration and sharpness (a
counterrevolutionary uprising, mutiny, banditry, the unleashing ofcivil war). " Christopher Jones, "Soviet
Military Doctrine and Warsaw Pact Exercises," in Derek Leenaert, ed., Soviet Military Thinking, London.
George Allen & Unwin. 1981, p. 229.
94 Christopher Donnelly, "Red Banner: the Soviet Military System in Peace and War," Coulsdon, Surrey:
Jane's Information Group, 1988, p. 239.
95 Ibid, p. 239.
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D. PILLARS OF THE COMMUNISTS PARTY CONTROL OF THE
ARMED FORCES
As Rudolf Joo argues, "Recent history of the Communist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, and of the former Soviet Union, indicates that the Communist parties
neverfully trusted the professional military. 96
In order to prevent military coups in Communist regimes and maintain
unconditional loyalty of the military to the Party, several important steps were taken. The
Party had three mechanisms of control over the country's armed forces:
First, the top military leaders were systematically integrated into the highest
echelons of the Political Bureau, Communist Party Central Committee and subjected to
party discipline.
Second, the Communist party placed a network of political officers throughout the
armed forces to influence the activities of the military.
Third, the special departments, under the direction of the Communist party,
maintained a network of officers and informers in the armed forces. 97
In the former Soviet Ministry of Defense, the high ranking generals were regularly
elected as members or candidate members to the CPSU's Central Committee. 98 Central
96 Rudolf Joo, p. 15.
97 Rudolf Joo, p. 16.
98 Central Committee {ofthe CPSU) "A political 'general staff ofthe Politburo. It was comprised of
over 300 voting and candidate members. Its work was effected through about twenty-four varied
departments which provided the staffworkfor the Politburo and control ofthe state apparatus, including
the military. Next to the Politburo, the Central Committee was the principalformulator ofCommunist
Party political strategy, includingforeign policy.
"
Politburo "The apex ofdecision-making in the USSR. It was comprised ofabout twenty-two members (14
voting, 8 candidates). "Elected" by the Party's Central Committee, the Politburo was the highest policy-
making bodyfor all Party and State matters, including defense affairs. It established and guided the
political strategy ofthe Party and was the final authority on military doctrine. " John J. Dziak, Soviet
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Committee membership came with certain important posts and major field commands.
Military officers with full membership on the Central Committee generally included the
minister of defense, the first deputy ministers of defense, the deputy ministers of defense
and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Candidate
members of the Central Committee included the commanders of military districts and
fleets. The commanders of military districts and fleets were usually members of Central
and Regional Party Committees of the Soviet republics in which the district or fleet was
located."
One of the most important channels of Party influence was the Main Political
Directorate (or the Main Political Department, as it was called in some countries).
Originally, the commissar or political officer system was developed by Trotsky's
revolutionary Red Army in 1918-19, to ensure the loyalty of the large numbers of former
Tsarist officers in the new Red Army during the Civil War in Russia (1917-1922). 10°
Perceptions ofMilitary Power: The Interaction ofTheory and Practice, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc.
New York., 1981. pp. 69 and 72.
99 By virtue of their position and membership in the Communist Party "senior military officers sat as
members ofthese Central, Regional and District Party Committees. On one hand, CRSU could control
the military through the Committees but on the other hand the military has a real voice in local
government, and local Party officials have: (a) a responsibility to help and support the military in their
area; (b) the ability to supervise and monitor local military activity and the state ofaffairs in the local
garrisons, and; (c) an immediateformal link by which the military can be involved in matters oflocal
security or in even ofnational emergency. This contact also allows senior Party and military officials to
make the personal contacts andforge links ofpersonalfriendship and respect which mean so much to the
smooth running ofany society but which are crucial to the Soviet system. " Christopher Donnelly,
"Military Involvement in Government" in Red Banner: the Soviet Military System in Peace and War,
Coulsdon, Surrey: Janes 's Information Group, 1988, pp. 95-96.
100 Rudolf Joo, p. 17, and R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star. A History ofSoviet Security Policy
(London: Ithaca, 1992),pp. 18-19. For more information see also Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott,
The Armed Forces ofthe USSR (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 257-258.
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Immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Vladimir I. Lenin, leader of
the communists, decreed the establishment of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on
January 28, 1918, and Leon Trotsky was then first Commissar for War. 101 The
communists recognized the importance of building an army under their control; without a
loyal army, the Communist Party itself would have been unable to hold the power it had
seized. The Main Political Directorate (MPD) "was the principal instrument used by the
Central Committee of the CPSU to maintain political control over the armed forces,
including rigid adherence to the Communist Party policies and directives. " 102 It
organized, conducted, and reported on political and ideological indoctrination in the
armed forces, supervised the military press, and monitored the ideological content of
101 Trotskii, Lev Davidovich (Bronstein; Trotsky, Leon.) 11.7. 1879-8. 20. 1940. "Revolutionary,
politician. Born at Ianovka near Elizavetgrad (Kirovograd) in Ukraine. Son ofan estate manager.
Educated at Odessa High School. Early involvement in revolutionary activity. Arrested and exiled to
Siberia, 1898. Became a member ofthe Social-Democratic Party ofRussia. Worked with Lenin on Iskra.
After the split ofthe Social-Democratic Party ofRussia, 1903, joined the anti-Lenin Menshevikfraction.
Officiallyjoined the Bolsheviks in Aug. 191 7. Member ofthe Central Committee ofthe Bolshevik Party.
Main organizer and practical leader ofthe October Revolution in 1917. Created the RedArmy and
achieved victory in the Civil War in Russia by his extremely effective actions: his use ofunprecedented
terror (special Cheka detachments, often Latvian, Chinese, orfrom revolutionary groups ofprisoners of
war, especially Hungarian), and his use ofprofessional military cadresfrom the Imperial Army drafted to
the RedArmy, their complete loyalty insured by a double hostage system-firstly by a communist political
commissar attached as a supervisor to every military commander and secondly by the hostage situation of
the members ofthe officers 'families. Brilliant orator, he overshadowed Lenin and completely
overwhelmed Stalin, whom he in any case treated with open contempt, calling him 'the most outstanding
mediocrity. ' Proposed schemes ofmass compulsion (labor armies and collectivization) which were
successfully denounced by Stalin as extremist (and later realized by him in a modifiedform). Removed
from his post as Commissar of War, 1925, andfrom Politburo, 1926. Expelledfrom the party with his
followers, 1927, exiled to Alma-Ata, 1928, and banishedfrom the USSR, 1929. Lived in exile in Turkey,
1929-33, and in France, 1933-35. After a short stay in Norway, moved to Mexico, 1936. Wrote on the
Russian revolution and on Stalinism, and tried to organize the 4th International as a pure revolutionary
movement, not corrupted by Stalinist bureaucracy. Killed by Mercador, a Spanish agent ofStalin, in his
study in Coyoacan by an ice-pick blow to the skull. " A Biographical Dictionary ofthe Soviet Union
191 7-1988, by Jeanne Vronskaya with Vladimir Chuglev, Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe LTD
Chippenham Wiltshire, 1989, p. 446.
102
"Handbook of the Soviet Armed Forces", DDB-2680-40-78, Defense Intelligence Agency, Febryary
1978, pp. 2-6.
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military publications. The Central Committee "appointed MPD leaders to serve on the
Bureau, the executive body of the Main Political Directorate, which was responsible for
the overall implementation of Party policy in the armed forces, basing its activity on
Central Committee directives. " ,03 "As was the case with many other Soviet institutions,
the MPD was copied almost in detail and introduced by the people 's armies established
at the end of the 1940s" in all the Warsaw Pact Countries. 104
The Main Political Directorate was subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, as well
as to the Communist party Central Committee. It had the official status of a Central
Committee department and reported to the Central Committee outside the military chain
of command. These reports included information on the political attitudes and reliability of
armed forces personnel and high-ranking officers in particular. The Main Political
Directorate supervised a network of political organizations and officers within the armed
forces. Every armed service, territorial command, and supporting service had a Political
directorate (Politicheskiye upraleniya). 105 Service branches, divisions, and military
education institutions had Political departments (Politicheskiye otdely) which were
103
"Handbook of the Soviet Armed Forces", DDB-2680-40-78, Defense Intelligence Agency, Febryary
1978, pp. 2-6.
104 Rudolf Joo, p. 17.
105 Political directorate (Politicheskiye upraleniya) and Political departments (Politicheskiye otdely)
"The leading Party organs ofthe Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union (CPSU) in the armedforces ofthe
USSR in the field ofParty-political work. It is an obligation ofpolitical departments to devote all their
work to strengthening the combat might ofthe SovietArmy and Navy, ensuring the daily and undivided
influence ofthe Communist Party on the entire life and activity ofthe Armed Forces, and the solidarity of
personnel around the CPSU and the Soviet government. Political departments are created in the army
and in the fleet by the Ministry ofDefense and the Main Political Directorate in accordance with the
structure established by the Central Committee ofthe CPSU. " Dictionary ofBasic andMilitary Terms (A
Soviet View) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 166.
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smaller than directorates. Each political department had a small staff that included a chief,
a deputy chief, several senior political instructors, and officers responsible for agitation
and propaganda, party organizational work and komsomol organizations (Ail-Union
Leninist League of Communist Youth). 106 A party commission of high-ranking personnel
was attached to each political directorate and department. A deputy commander for
political affairs was assigned to each unit of company, battery, and squadron size or
larger. 107 A deputy political commander (zampolit) served as a political commissar of the
armed forces. Zampolits were representatives of Communist party in uniform. A zampolit
supervised party organizations and conducted party political work within a military
unit. 108 The main form of party-political work, in terms of ideological influence, in peace
106 Komsomol organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy (Komsomol'skiye organizatsii v Sovetskoy
Armii I Voyenno-Morskom Flote) "Komsomol organizations, uniting members oj'All-Union Leninist
League ofCommunist Youth in units, installations, in military educational institutions, and in
establishments; they are active helpers ofthe organizations ofthe Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union
by putting into practice the policies ofthe Communist Party and the Armed Forcesfor strengthening their
military power. The Komsomol organizations in the Soviet army and navy unite young servicemen around
the Communist Party and teach them loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, valor and heroism, selfless devotion
to the socialist Motherland, and constant readiness to defend her. They motivate youth to master combat
materiel and weaponry, and to successfully complete the tasks ofcombat and political training, as well as
to observe without deviation the requirements ofmilitary discipline and the principles ofthe moral code
ofa builder ofcommunism. " Dictionary ofBasic and Military Terms (A Soviet View) (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1976), p. 105.
107
"Handbook of the Soviet Armed Forces", DDB-2680-40-78, Defense Intelligence Agency, Febryary
1978, pp. 2-6.
108 Party-political work ( Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota) "A most important means ofstrengthening the
moral and political conditions ofpersonnel, enhancing the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of
troops, and mobilizing personnel to successful completion ofcombat mission for the purpose ofachieving
the utter defeat ofthe enemy. Party-political work is accomplished by all commanders( and chiefs), by
political organs, and by Party and Komsomol organizations. " Dictionary ofBasic and Military Terms (A
Soviet View) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 153.
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time was political training of military personnel. 109 Like the old political commissars,
the modern zampolit remained responsible for keeping soldiers, and even entire front-line
combat units, from deserting or defecting. The political work in combat situation was
very important part of the political officer's activity. 110 All levels of the Party's military-
political structure paid great attention to preparing political officers for conducting
political work in combat situations. Usually, this training was organized during joint
military exercises of the armed forces ofWTO countries to provide exchanges of opinion
among political officers of different countries. Without any doubt, the Soviet view in this
matters dominated.
Political officers of the Warsaw Pact countries had a full responsibility for
maintaining high political-moral fighting qualities of military personnel of their military
unit. * ! * That is why among all other duties the zampolits were responsible for resolving
109 Political training of Soviet Armed Forces personnel (Politicheskaya podgotovka lichnogo sostava
Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil) "A system ofmeasuresfor the ideological and political education of
personnel. It includes: political sessions with soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and senior NCO 's; training of
generals, admirals and officers in the tenets ofMarxism-Leninism; political education ofservicemen and
theirfamilies, and ofArmy and Navy civilian workers and employees (evening courses in Marxism-
Leninism, Party schools, groups, and seminars). " Dictionary ofBasic andMilitary Terms (A Soviet View)
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1976), p. 166.
110 Political work in combat situation (Politicheskaya rabota v boyevoy obstanovke) "The system of
measures in propaganda, agitation, and political education, implemented by political organs, Party and
Komsomol organizations, commanders, and political workers, among servicemen and the civilian
population in the zone ofcombat operations, and also among enemy armedforces personnel and
population. " Dictionary ofBasic andMilitary Terms (A Soviet View) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965),
translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 166.
1
1
' Political-moral fighting qualities of armed forces personnel (Politiko-moralnyye I boyevyye
kachestva lichnogo sostava vooruzhennykh sil) "The moral-political, combat, psychological, and
intellectual qualities which are needed by a serviceman in modern warfare. Political-moral combat
qualities that are cultivated in the SovietArmed Forces include a high level ofsocial awareness and
devotion to the Motherland and the ideals ofCommunism; proletarian internationalism; faithfulness to
the oath and to military comradeship; hatred ofenemies; alertness; consciousness ofmilitary duty;
heroism; willingnessfor self-sacrificefor the sake ofvictory over the enemy; a high level ofdiscipline; a
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morale, disciplinary, and interpersonal problems. In this terms, negative reports from the
zampolit could exert considerable influence on a commander's career. Smaller military
units had Primary Party Organizations (PPO). Each PPO had a secretary, and
secretaries met in their regiment's or ship's party committee to elect a party bureau. 112 The
Party organizations within the armed forces and the Main Political Directorate "had
international ideologicalfunctions. The political education they provided had to deepen
"proletarian internationalism" among the Soviet military and other armies of the
Warsaw Pact.. .In practice, "internationalism" meant subordination of the national
interest to geopolitical considerations imposed by the Soviet Union. " 113 There were a
variety of MPD tasks in the Communist countries. For example, in the Polish People's
Army even the Army chaplains were directly subordinated by MPD. 1 14
The Special Departments was another instrument of party control over the armed
forces. The history of the Special Departments in the Soviet Armed Forces dates back to
1918. Since the 1918, an important internal security function of the security police has
sense ofmilitary honor; courage; initiative; respectfor combat materiel; etc. " Dictionary ofBasic and
Military Terms (A Soviet View) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 166.
1 12 Party organizations in the armed forces (Partiynyye organizatsii v vooruzhennykh silakh) "Party
organizations uniting Party members in unit (warships), in military educational institutions, and in
establishments. The principal task ofParty organizations is to implement requirements ofthe Program of
the Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union, namely, that the SovietArmed Forces shall be an efficient and
coordinated organism, having a high level oforganization and discipline, fulfilling in an exemplary
manner the missions assigned to them by the Party, the government and the people, and being ready at
any moment to inflict a shattering repulsive blow against imperialist aggressors. " Dictionary ofBasic
and Military Terms (A Soviet View) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 153- 154.
113 Rudolf Joo, p. 17-18.
114 Rudolf Joo, p. 18, and George C. Malcher, Poland's PoliticizedArmy, (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1984), pp. 227-229.
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been ensuring the political reliability of the Soviet Armed Forces. Special Departments
(Osobye Otdely) were under the supervision of the KGB's Third Chief Directorate.
Officially designated as a military counterintelligence organization, the Third Chief
Directorate performed tasks that extended far beyond counterintelligence to encompass
extensive political surveillance of the military and other military security duties. 115
The Special departments used networks of informers inside military units and were
responsible for:
a) monitoring foreign contacts of armed forces personnel and protection military
secrets;
b) security clearances of military personnel and ensuring that security regulations
and procedures strictly observed in all branches of the armed forces;
c) control of military personnel files and information relating to the political
reliability of members of the armed forces.
According to opinion of political researcher Amy W. Knight, the Special
departments were in a position of much greater authority than the MPD.
Firstly, special departments themselves had officials within the MPD who
monitored the activity of its personnel.
Secondly, the Special Departments operated with more autonomy vis-a-vis the
central party apparatus.
115 W. Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments in the Soviet Armed Forces," Orbis, Summer 1984. pp.
257-280.
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Thirdly, the actual direction of the KGB and its Special Departments was
implemented at the highest level, the Politburo. For example, from 1973 until 1982 the
KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, was a full member of that body. 1 16
A key element of special department activities was political surveillance on both a
formal and an informal level. Unknown to a commander or zampolit, an officer of special
department could be reporting on their political attitudes, outside of the military or the
Main Political Directorate channels.
E. CONCLUSIONS:
1. Under communism, the armed forces of in the Communist states of Europe were
under the complete control not only of their national communist parties but also the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and Warsaw Pact
Organization.
2. The relationship between the East European Communist Parties and the armed
forces formed a unique pattern of civil-military relations in the East European Communist
Countries (EECC).
3. The Soviet Union exercised control over the EECC through political, economic
and military mechanisms at the domestic level, the bilateral level, and the multinational
level.
1 16 See Amy W. Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments in the Soviet Armed Forces," Orbis, Summer
1984. p. 277.
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4. Each state's domestic communist party apparatus had to submit to Soviet
authority through bilateral and economic agreements. In addition, the mechanisms of the
multinational Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) controlled the armed forces of the East
European Communist Countries.
5. Strong Soviet mechanisms of control guaranteed Soviet hegemony and
existence of the illegitimate communist regimes of Eastern Europe.
6. To understand the nature of civil-military relations in the EECC one has to take
into account the domination of civil-military relations of Soviet-communist political
system in general. The structure and functions of the Party and the Governments in the
EECC were very similar to those in the Soviet Union.
7. The Communist Party's control over the armed forces was not truly democratic
because its institutions lacked the basic requirements of democratic control and
accountability.
8. The Communist Party had three firm mechanisms of control over the country's
armed forces.
First, the top military leaders had been systematically integrated into the highest
echelons of the Political Bureau, the Communist Party Central Committee, and subjected
to party discipline.
Second, the Communist party has placed a network of political officers throughout
the armed forces to influence the activities of the military.
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Third, the special departments, under the direction of the Communist party,
maintained a network of officers and informers in the armed forces.
As a result, one can summarize all of the above in one final conclusion: civil-
military relations of the former Warsaw Pact countries had unique, but highly
undemocratic characteristics.
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IV. ENDS AND MEANS OF REFORM: POLAND'S ROAD TO
DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES
A. PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES OF CHANGE OF CTVTJL-
MBLITARY RELATIONS
Hungarian scholar Rudolf Joo has said: "Civil-military relations mirror the
society and the political regime in which they are built up. Currently, in Central and
Eastern Europe they reflect a transitory society and political system in which old and
new elements coexist. Old and new laws, institutions and policy-making mechanisms,
each designed to serve a very differentpower structure, frequently exist side-by side
"ni
The transformation process in the former Communist countries faces profound
difficulties of change. Rudolf Joo has listed and examined common problems and
difficulties of all Partner countries on the way to democratic transformation. According to
him, the process of transformations from communist to democratic control over the armed
forces is equally difficult for both the civilian and the military side. In general, the civilian
side faces the following problems and difficulties:
Firstly, "there was virtually no civilian expertise on defense and security
matters.
" 118
Under the communist regime these issues were excluded from public debate due to
military secrecy. Because of the strict policy of the communist parties not many civil
servants in the former WTO countries had enough knowledge on military and national
1 17 Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The Experience of Hungary," Chaillot Paper
No 23; Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, Paris-February 1996, p. 20.
118 Rudolf Joo, p.21.
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security matters. 119 In such a complicated situation the control by civilian administrators
can become more of a formality than a reality within the defense ministries of the former
WTO countries.
Secondly, "in some countries of the former Warsaw Pact, for example,
Czechoslovakia, for various reasons of recent or more distant history, the civil
population harbored explicit anti-militaryfeelings" , 120
Reka Szemerke' nyi, a leading Hungarian analyst and researcher of civil-military
relations argues: "Public support for the military is an important prerequisite for stable
civil-military relations in democratic society. The public support requires an
understanding of the military and of its professional and social needs. The media, the
government's own public-relations policies and research institutes... play an important
role in informing the public. However, in post-Warsaw Pact Central Europe, the media's
role has tended to be more ambiguous and can become easily politicized. " 121
In order to understand strong negative anti-military public opinion in the particular
case of the Czech Republic, we should take into account real historical facts that "neither
the Czech, Slovak, nor the Czechoslovak militaries have actually fought for national
independence or to defend the country.
"122 They fought against Germany in France, Italy
and Russia and proved themselves good soldiers on the battlefields of the First World
War, but they didn't fight directly for the Czecho-Slovak homeland. In 1938, in spite of
119 Chris Donnelly, op. cit. p. 7; Peter M.E. Volten, "On Annualizing Civil-Military Relations, " a
research outline, manuscript, Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groningen, 1994, p. 8.
120 Rudolf Joo, pp. 22-23.
121 Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, p. 54.
122 Re'ka Szemerke" nyi, p. 55.
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initial military mobilization and readiness of the armed forces to defend their country, the
politicians made the decision "not to take up arms against Hitler's army. " 123 In 1968 the
Czech's Armed Forces maintained neutrality in the face of the invasion of Warsaw Pact's
joint armed forces. Hence, Czech society has a negative attitude and subsequent
skepticism toward the military. 124
Thirdly, "the concept of civilian control and political neutrality has not always
been correctly understood by the (civilian) politicians of the new democracies". 125
In order to eliminate communist ideology and its consequences from the military
body, the democratically consolidated political parties and fronts tried to enforce the
process of propagation of democratic liberal world views. This process sometimes was so
intensive for traditionally conservative military mind that number of officers considered
this democratic efforts as a new political indoctrination. 126
As mentioned above, the process of democratization and reform of civil-military
relations in the former Communist countries faces difficulties not only on the civilian, but
also the military side. These might be characterized thus:
First, the military has had no experience ofworking with civilians in top
positions within anMOD or parliament. " 127
123
Ibid., p. 55.
124 For more information see Stefan Sarvas, "Civil-Military Relations in the Czech Republic," (Prague:
Institute of International Relations, October 1995).






The ministries of defense of WTO countries were completely militarized. All
important positions there were occupied only by soldiers. The civilian personnel was in a
minority and could occupy just only technical assistance category with low-paid jobs.
Unlike civil servants, military personnel received a good salary and had full respect of the
political leaders and the society as well. This situation promoted the view that military
stood not as guardians of the countries but also as the best part of the society. It became
something of a closed caste. The process of 'civilianization' of ministries of defense during
the democratic transformation changed that situation directly to the opposite. "With the
arrival of a civilian minister and some top civilian aides, the respective positions have
been altered drastically ". 128
Second, "as a general rule, the armed forces had a positive attitude towards
democratic transition. Nevertheless, because of their previous relative isolation within
society, the military perhaps had more difficulty than many other groups in adapting to
the new, practical day-to-day conditions of a pluralistic democracy and a market
economy ". 129
The military lived in virtual isolation, with its own housing and clubs. Because of
its strict internal regulations they had little knowledge about open society and pluralism.
Criticism or open public debate was considered as an ideological aggression from the
West.




Third, " until the end of the 1980s, military servicemen could not take advantage
of the limited, but on occasion, steadily increasing personal contacts with the West and
opportunities offered by tourism.
" 13°
Unfamiliarity with the culture of other countries, lack of experience in international
contacts combined with an inability to speak Western languages led to a certain fear of the
unknown. As a psychological barrier this phenomenon had a negative impact on
democratic transformation of the armed forces and civil-military relations. It limited the
dynamism of the reorientation of professional contacts with the Western European and
Europe-Atlantic communities. 131
Worsening budgetary conditions also have been a very serious problem that has
hampered the smooth development of civil-military relations. In almost all countries of
the former Warsaw Pact, the last years were characterized by a considerable reduction of
the armed forces and cutting of the defense budget. The economic imbalance has led to a
situation in which in almost all former Warsaw Pact countries a large number of well-
trained young officers left the armed forces and entered the private sector, where
incomes are four to five times better those in the armed forces. "Officers have expressed






Rudolf Joo, pp. 24-25, and Anton Bebler, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Central and
Eastern Europe," NATO Review, August 1994, p. 30.
132 Rudolf Joo, p.25.
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B. TASKS OF REFORMING OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN
POLAND AND PROGRESS OF CHANGES
Jeffrey Simon, a leading American social science specialist in national military
strategy and threat analysis, has mentioned several stages in democratic transition of civil-
military relation of Poland. The process of democratic transformation started in Poland
after the martial law period (1981-1985). In 1988 General W. Jaruselski, the President of
the State Council and the leader of the ruling Polish United Worker's Party (PUWP) as
well , took the initiative to open "Round table Talks" with the democratic opposition. 133
As a result, "The Polish United Worker's Party's (PUWP) recognized political and trade
union pluralism in returnfor the creation ofa powerful new office ofpresident.
" 134 Early
in the winter of 1989, 'roundtable talks" began between the ruling Communist elite and
133 Roundtable Talks in Poland. "In the late 1980s, popular anger was becoming ever more visible in
Polish society, and social and political tensions were reaching a dangerous point. This atmosphere
threatened the communist government with the complete collapse ofits policies and the repudiation ofthe
communist system. The leaders ofthe armedforces, except General Wojciech Jaruzelski, declared that
they were not willing to repeat the experience ofthe Poznan riots of 1956, or the firing on the people in
1976. In addition, the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, made it quite clear that Soviet tanks would not
be given orders to save the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The result in Poland was that the
government wasforced to sit down with the opposition in order to work out someform ofconsensus and
to settle thefuture ofthe Polish republic. This was an unprecedented development in the history ofPolish
communism. The roundtable discussions, as the negotiations were called, began in 1988. The talks
centered atfirst on the status ofthe Polish economy and the steps needed to made it work again. This
time, the discussions included the best economic experts that could befound in Poland regardless oftheir
political view. The discussion, however, led to agreements only on shot-term economic measures, not to
the acceptance offundamental reforms. The creation ofa new economic system was postponed until after
the elections to be held in June 1989. The elections resulted in an overwhelming victoryfor the Solidarity
party, and, when a new Polish government wasformed, it included noncommunist ministers, for the first
time since 1948. In the final count, the Roundtable discussions did not accomplish much; however, they
did contribute to a peaceful transition ofpowerfrom the communists to the opposition, a process that
would have been unthinkable only afew years before. " Joseph Held, Dictionary ofEast European History
Since 1945, Greenwood Press, 1994, p. 365. For more information about Roundtable discussions see also:
Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Poland: A Year of Three Governments," Radio Free Europe Research Report.
1.1 (January 1, 1993), pp. 102-107; Louisa Vinton, "Poland: The Anguish of Transition," Radio Free
Europe Research Report 1.1 (January 3, 1991), pp. 91-95.
134 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion (Washington, DC:
National Defense University, McNair Paper 39, April 1995, p. 39.
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the Solidarity leaders. During this period parliamentary changes were made as were
important reforms of Constitution that had a great influence on the nature of political
control over the military.
In April of 1989, a Constitutional amendment changed the Defense Council's
(KOK) role. 135 It become a collegial state organ which was subordinated to the
Parliament. According to amendment, it must work in the defense and national security
areas for establishing general principles of national defense, including defense doctrine.
After this constitutional change the KOK included the President of Poland, the prime
minister and also the ministers of defense and foreign affairs as their deputies. The head of
the President's Office, the minister of finance, internal affairs, chief of the general staff and
the minister heading the office of the Council of Ministers also have become members of
KOK. 136
These accords opened the second stage of democratic transformation-the first
contested parliamentary elections in June 1989. As a result, in August 1989 a new
noncommunist government formed under the leader of the democratic opposition,
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In 1989 the peaceful transition from the Jaruzelski regime to the
popularly elected Solidarity-led government had little immediate impact on the
organization of the Polish military. General Florian Siwicki, who had been Jaruzelski's
135 Polish Defense Council (KOK) played a very important role during the communist period as a
supergovenmental argency that subordinated the defense and interior ministries to Communist party. For
more information see Leslaw Dudek, " On the Defense Doctrine of the Third Republic of Poland," Polska
Zbrojna, 10-12 July 1992, p. III.
136 Polish Army: Facts and Figures (In the Transition Period) (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense,
1991), pp. 9-12, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 43.
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minister of national defense, served in the first cabinet of noncommunist Prime Minister
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, leader of PUWP and military
commander in chief, was elected president of Poland by majority of parliament. In fact, the
presidency was restored just to serve as the locus of authority over the military and the
police, but the election of a noncommunist government in June 1989 completely changed
the political situation 137
Under Mazowiecki, Siwicki directed military reforms until he was replaced in
mid- 1990. This stage of reform had not only to make necessary changes to establish a
constitutional framework and clarify the line of authority between different branches of
government but also included the restoration of a positive image of armed forces in
society. As it is known, the restoration of military prestige is one of the main building
blocks in democratic reform of armed forces. The military partly lost their positive
reputation in their own eyes and, furthermore, in the eyes of Polish society. The country's
communist guardians used the Polish armed forces to solve domestic problems:
a) during the strike in Poznan in 1956 and in Gdansk and Szczecin
in 1970;
b) in Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; and
c) for implementing of martial law in 1980-1981. 138
137 Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "Poland's Road to Civilian Control" in Civil-Military Relations and
Democracy,(ed. by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner) The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996,
p.103.
1 38 poznan Riots of June 1956. "Poznan is located in central Poland on the Warta river. The city
developed rapidly during the twentieth century, and its port has become a major point ofembarkation for
the Polish export-import trade. It also became a center ofmachine tool and chemical industries. In June
1956, the workers ofthe city responded to sudden price increases offood and other consumer goods by
strikers, demonstrations, and riots. The communist government ordered the army and the secret police to
suppress the riots by any means necessary. The troopsfired on the demonstrators killing over 50 people
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The next serious problem was that "Poland's new leadership inherited empty
political 'traditions'.^ 9 The disappearance of Poland from the political map of Europe in
1795 and the establishment the almost total political and military control of the Soviet
Union over Poland in 1945 had negative influence on developing Poland's political
leadership. In pre-communist Poland there was a tradition of giving dictatorial power to
military leaders during times of crisis-especially during the fight for independence. As a
result, the Polish military was seen as the guardian of certain national and soldierly
traditions. The military also saw itself as representing the national interest. During the
twenty years of the Second Republic (1918-1939), tensions between the armed forces and
the civilian government resulted in the military coup. In May 1926 a semi-military rule was
established by Marshal Joseph Pilsudski. It followed after his death in 1935 by a power-
and wounding more than 300. This action raised general indignation throughout Poland. The People 's
Army, so called, killing ordinary people! The army was deeply shaken by its role in Poznan. Its officers
and recruits were on the verge ofmutiny. The generals declared that, in case ofa Soviet invasion, they
would order the troops to fight.
"
Gdansk Riots. "Originally an ancient Slav settlement, located on a branch ofthe Vistula river at the
GulfofGdansk, the city was a member ofthe Hanseatic League in the course ofthe thirteenth century.
Since that time, the majority ofthe population consisted ofGerman craftsmen and merchants. The city
was also a point at which German and Polish nationalism collided, and itprovided the sparkfor the
outbreak of World War II. During the communist era, Gdansk was a busy Polish port on the Baltic sea. Its
huge Shipyard, one ofthe largest in the world, served as a source ofshipbuildingfor the Soviet Union
and other East European countries. The shipyard workers included some ofthe best-known people in
Poland in the 1970s and 1980s, among them Lech Walesa andAnna Walentynowicz. In 1970, when riots
broke out in Poznan and the Polish armyfired on the demonstrating workers, the unrest spread to
Gdansk, where it eventually led to theformation ofan Inter-factory Strike Committee, aforerunner ofthe
Solidarity trade union. Disturbances occured in Gdansk in 1976 and 1980; the 1980 disturbances led to
the building ofSolidarity. This organization was eventually instrumental in the destruction ofthe
communist regime and the transformation ofPoland into a democratic society. " Joseph Held, "Dictionary
of East European History Since 1945," Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 331, 359. For more information see
also: Konrad Syrop, Spring in October: The Story ofthe Polish Revolution of 1956 (London, 1958);
Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland, 1918-1990," in Joseph Held, ed. The Columbia History ofEastern Europe in
the Twentieth Century (New York, 1992); Flora Lewis, The Polish Volcano (London, 1959).
139 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion (Washington, DC:
National Defense University, McNair Paper 39, April 1995, p.40.
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sharing between the civilians and the military. We should also take into account the fact
that during the short period of independence of Poland from 1919 to 1939 "having been
formed from three different empires-German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian-and
having no more than 60 percent of its population as Polish, Poland was neither state nor
a nation.
" 140 Consequently, the military in Poland played different roles in this difficult
period. 141 It must be also admitted that the imposition of the communist regime in Poland
after World War II created a totally new situation for civil-military relations. The military
was completely subordinated, not to the state, but to the Communist Party through a
system of political commissars. The military was also subordinated to Moscow and the
requirements of the Warsaw Pact. Moscow determined Poland's defense policy. There was
a penchant for secrecy within the army so that military matters were never discussed
between military and civilian leaders. Moreover, the military lived in virtual isolation, with
its own housing and clubs. As a result, there was little civilian knowledge of military
affairs. Under General Wojciech Jaruselski the armed forces became the key institution of
the system. 142 From February 1981 he served as prime minister and since October 1981
also as first secretary of the ruling PUWP. 143
140 Jeffrey Simon, pp. 40-41.
141 Jeffrey Simon, p. 41, and Andrej Korbonski, "Civil-Military Relations In Poland Between the Wars:
1918-1939," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 14, No.2 (Winter 1988), pp. 173-176.
142 Jaruzelski, Wojciech (1923- ). "Jaruzelski has been a military officer most ofhis life. He fought
against the Germans in World War II and survived the war. He joined the Polish communist party in 1944
and , in 1956, rose to the rank ofgeneral. In 1960, he became the armedforces ' representative in the
Central Committe ofthe Polish United Worcers party. He was, thus, a political general. At one point in
his career, he was appointed to membership in the military command ofthe Warsaw Pactforces. He was
a fully convinced Marxist-Leninist, and, accordingly, the Soviet leaders completely trusted the Polish
general. On December 13, 1981, Jaruzelski took over the government ofa Poland torn by strife between
striking worcers and the communist regime. Jaruzelski, arguing that ifhe had not acted, the Soviet army
would have marched into Poland, declared martial law, outlawed the Solidarity trade union and, had its
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Taking into consideration all the above one must conclude that the agenda of
rebuilding of civil-military relations and restoration of military prestige within society were
the most important issues during this stage of Polish political reform. Despite difficulties
mentioned above, military reform, including the idea of democratic political control, made
some progress. After the 1989 elections, Parliament, and first of all Solidarity's leaders,
started to provide reliable control of the military. In order to oversee the military, to
remove influence of communists and to provide reliable governmental control over the
defense ministry, reforms made several important steps, but not without some missteps, as
well.
First, they created the Home Defense Committee to provide civilian control over
the defense ministry. It was headed by the president and included the prime minister, the
minister of defense and minister of interior affairs. The Minister of Finance and the
speakers of the Sejm and Senate were also included in this structure. 144
leaders and supporters arrested and thrown into jail. He also took control over the secret police and used
itfor the restoration ofcalm in Poland. Jaruzelski wasfully supported by Leonid Brezhnev and his Soviet
colleagues. In 1982, new demonstrations erupted in Poland against martial law, and these were put down
with great brutality on Jaruzelski 's orders by the secret police. The Western powers introduced an
embargo on Polish goods. In 1983, therefore, Jaruzelski wasforced to lift martial law, but this did not
bring about the end ofgeneral repression ofthe dissenters. Two years later, Jaruzelski stepped downfrom
the post ofprime minister, but he remained head ofthe Polish United Workers party. An obedient
parliament, filled with communist deputies, elected him president ofthe republic, so that he retained
considerable power. In 1989, when the communist regime collapsed, the opposition agreed to Jaruzelski
continued presidency. However, in thefree elections of 1990, Jaruzelski was replaced by Lech Walesa,
hisformer Solidarity opponent as president ofPoland. " Joseph Held, "Dictionary of East European
History Since 1945," Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 339-340. For more information about Wojciech
Jaruzelski and this dramatic period of Polish history see: Ash, Timothy, Garton, The Polish Revolution
(London, 1985); George Malcher, Poland's PoliticizedArmy (New York, 1984); Bronislaw Misztal,
Poland after Solidarity: Social Movements Versus the State (New Brunswick, NJ, 1985).
143 For more information see Jerzy J.Wiatr, "The Political Role of the Military in a New Democracy:
Poland,"in Constantine Danopolous and Cyntia Watson, eds., The Political Role ofthe Military: An
International Handbook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).
144 Polish Army: Facts and Figures, (1990), pp. 11-12, and Jeffrey. Simon, p.44.
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Second, they created a Sejm Commission for Defense which had the right to enter
any military installation on demand.
Third, they created Social Consultative Council of the ministry of national defense
(MON) which included all representatives of the political parties and groups in the Sejm.
The Council had an inspection authority, and supervised the social conditions of the
military and the education. 145
Fourth, the Council of Ministers established the Political Advisory Committee
which consisted of members of Parliament and a representative of the president. The aim
of the committee was to examine issues and provide consultations on questions coming
within the defense ministry's power. The committee had an advisory role without any
authority to contradict the chain of command of the army. 146
Fifth, an important step was made when two Solidarity civilian leaders became
Poland's first civilian deputy defense ministers. They were Bronislaw Komorowski and
Janusz Onyszkiewicz. Having received responsibility for educational (former political)
training within the armed forces and international military affairs respectively they aimed
to dismantle the Main Political Administration and thus take over military's international
contacts. This reform represented the first attempt to provide direct civilian control over
two important areas in defense policy. As a result of this policy in order to depoliticize the




military Mazowiecki dismantled the Main Political Administration (MPA) and created a
Central Education Board. 147
Finally, a significant step toward to democratic civilian control over the military
was made by the democratically consolidated Polish government when in February 1990
the new military doctrine was adopted. It underlined not only parliamental and presidential
control of the armed forces but also highlighted the national interest in a vastly different
European strategic situation although Poland was still de jure a member of the Warsaw
Pact: "The Superior of the Armed Forces is the President of the Polish Republic. The
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces... in wartime is appointed by the Sejm. In the
event of war an appropriate operational grouping remaining under national command
and acting as part of the Combined Armed Forces... of the Warsaw Pact, is isolatedfrom
within the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic. The authorities of the Polish
Republic... retain their influence on decisions affecting the use of that grouping in
consonance with national interests.
" 148
After the presidential elections in Poland in December 1990 which brought Lech
Walesa to the presidency and the appointment of Jan Bielecki as the second non-
communist prime minister in January 1991 started third stage of democratic
transformation. 1^ This period can be characterized as a situation when "conflicts
147 Thomas S. Szayna, The Military in a Postcommunist Poland, RAND, N-3309-USDR, 1991, p. 26, and
Jeffrey Simon, p. 45.
148 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion (Washington, DC:
National Defense University, McNair Paper 39, April 1995, p.43.
149 Walesa, Lech (1943- ). "Walesa was born during World War II, while hisfather was in a German
labor camp, from which he never came out alive. The young Walesa was apprenticed to become an
electrician and was employed by the Lenin shipyards at Gdansk. In 1970, when he was twenty-seven years
11
between the constitutional committees of the communist-dominated Sejm and Solidarity-
dominated Senate grew to the point that they broke offall contacts with each other.
" l5°
Walesa launched a new phase of reform in security affairs to strengthen the
presidential position by transferring powers from the communist Sejm to the president.
Walesa chaired the KOK which provided control over the armed forces and police. He
also tried to transform the KOK into National Security Council with full presidential
financial control. The President thus created The National Security Bureau (BBN). The
purpose of the Bureau was to prepare defense analyses and forecasts of internal and
external situation. This body has developed Polish military doctrine and drafts for military
reforms. 151
In order to expand presidential authority in security affairs, and strengthen
executive control over the military, in February 1991 Lech Walesa announced the
old, he participated in the riots that ended with the shooting death ofoverfifty workers by the hands of
the Polish People 'sArmy. This left an impression on him that, from then on, Walesa became a dissident
among the workers. In April 1978, Walesa was among the group ofpeople who announced the formation
ofthe Baltic Committeefor Free and Independent Trade Unions... Walesa was a member ofthe group that
decided to issue a newspaper, Worker ofthe Coast. At the end ofDecember 1978, he wasfiredfrom his
job for his political activity. Hefound a newjob in the Gdansk shipyards as an electrician. However, he
continued his clandestine activities, and he was, once again, fired. When new protests erupted in the
factories in Gdansk after the sudden price increases in the Summer of 1980, the workers demanded not
only that they be withdrawn but also that Walesa be reinstated. He was instrumental in the establishment
ofSolidarity, and become its most articulate spokesman. On December 31, 1981, he was arrested when
martial law was imposed on Poland, together with other leaders ofSolidarity and their supporters.
Walesa was kept in confinement until 1983 when he was conditionally released. During the Roundtable
negotiations in 1988, he was one ofthe leaders ofthe workers ' representatives. In the presidential
elections of 1990, Walesa won the presidency after a runoff. " Joseph Held, "Dictionary of East European
History Since 1945," Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 370-371. For more information about Lech Walesa see:
Walter Brolewicz, My Brother Walesa (New York, 1984); Mary Craig, Lech Walesa and His Poland
(New York, 1987); Lech Walesa, A Way ofHope: An Autobiography (New York, 1987).
150 Jeffrey Simon, p. 46.
151 Report On Eastern Europe, 22 February 1991, p. 50, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 47.
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necessity to install a civilian defense minister in the future. 152 Lech Walesa and Jan
Bielecki also announced a great importance of defense reform. According to them, during
defense reform the following results had to be reached:
1
.
transform the defense ministry into a civilian state organ;
2. establish a new structure for the armed forces;
3 make the defense industry much more efficient
;
4. establish in Parliament organizations of democratic civilian control. 153
From Prime Minister Bielecki's view the aims of this reform were "to improve the
army's image, and credibility, to put the defense ministry under civilian control, and to
make the armedforces a separate, apolitical organization. "154
According to the plan of defense reform, three following civilian deputy of defense
ministers would be appointed:
1) "a deputy minister for educational affairs (formerly for social relations and
education), responsible for setting educational and cultural policy within the armed
forces andfor organizing cooperation with the military chaplains' service;
2) a deputy for defense policy and planning, responsible for developing defense
policy and a long-range concept for developing the armedforces to deal with Poland's
external threats;
3) a deputy ministerfor armaments and military infrastructure, responsible for the
defense industry andfor delivery, repair, and upgrading ofweaponry and material.
" 155
152 Lech Walesa interview, Polska Zbrojna, 1-3 February 1991, pp. 1,2. FBIS-EEU-91-024 (5 February
1991), p. 36. Walesa received Sejm approval in July 1991, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 48.





Unfortunately, these and many others efforts were stalled because of tensions
between the communist-dominated Sejm, on the one hand, and the Senate and the
president, on the other. Anyway, toward the end of third stage of democratic
transformation, Poland made yet further progress toward democratic civilian control over
the military:
First, Poland depoliticized the army on the old model by dismantling all
Communist Party organs and eliminating the political officers.
Second, Poland secured the loyalty of the military to the new government.
Third, Poland modified and then ended the ties between the military and Moscow.
This step required a strategic reorientation and a developing of Poland's capability
to determine its own defense policies.
C. CRISIS IN CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY
The fourth stage of democratic transformation started after the full Sejm and
Senate democratic elections held on 27 October 1991. The fifth stage started after the fall
1993 Sejm and Senate elections, with the return of the socialists and the constitutional
crisis in Poland. 156 Although during the last two stages of democratic transformations,
Poland initiated an extensive domestic defense reform to provide civilian control and
extensive restructuring of the military, and returned the armed forces to the people, one
must also characterize this period as a serious crisis in Polish civil-military relations. Due
to the unclear division of authority over the military, soldiers often became an object of
156 Jeffrey Simon, p. 39.
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political clashes and thus politicized. These clashes emerged because of ambiguities in the
Constitution over supreme command of the armed forces. 157
After the parliamentary election in October 1991, Lech Walesa failed to win a
political base in the new Parliament which was dominated by the right-wing parties. Prime
Minister Jan Olszewski, who led new Parliament's coalition government, appointed Jan
Parys as a defense minister. In fact, he was the first civilian defense minister of Poland. In
this internal political situation, with the absence of a new constitution, Walesa conducted
the same policy toward national security affairs and control over the armed forces as
before. With the purpose to create a forum for providing executive presidential control
over security and defense matter on 31 December 1991, the published a decree about the
structure and functions of the National Security Council (NSC). 158 In accordance with the
decree, NSC was chaired by President Walesa, as a Superior of the Armed Forces,
included Prime Minister Olszewski, as NSC's first deputy chairman, Defense Minister Jan
Parys and National Security Bureau (BBN) Chief Jerzy Milewski as a deputies. Other
members of NSC included of the both speakers of Parliament (the Sejm and Senate),the
minister of foreign affairs, the minister of finance, the minister of internal affairs, the chief
of staff, and one of the secretaries of state from the president's chancellery. The distinction
between the NSC and BBN was that NSC had to consider national security, defense,
157 Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "Poland's Road to Civilian Control" in Civil-Military Relations and
Democracy, (ed. by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Planner) The Jones Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp.
105-106.
158 Jeffrey Simon, p. 50.
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public security, order and citizens security matters. The BBN was responsible for
identifying threats to security and preparing appropriate solutions to meet them. 159
In spite of Walesa's effort to strengthen the executive branch the new defense
minister acted on his own. He retired Inspector General of the Armed Forces, Admiral
Kolodziejczyc, from active service without even informing the president in advance and
announced that he would not appoint a new Inspector General until "Parliament amended
the Constitution.
"160 Soon afterwards two deputies of the Minister of Defense,
Komorowski and Onyszkiewicz, left their positions. Relations between the Minister of
Defense and the president deteriorated rapidly, because of the ambiguity of constitutional
provisions concerning democratic civilian control over the military. As Jeffrey Simon
stated: "The crisis arose over different interpretations of presidential and defense
ministerial authority as well as over policy andpersonality differences. It ended with the
resignation of the new (and first) civilian defense minister, exacerbated Polish civil-
military relations, and brought the collapse of the new, though weak, government
coalition... The powers of the president, prime minister, and parliament need to be
clarified and until such a constitution has been adopted, Polish defense reform can not
be achieved. " 161
Hence, one can conclude that the ambiguity of constitutional provisions and
differences in interpretations concerning command and control over the military not only
159 Jeffrey Simon, pp. 50-51.
160 Ibid., p. 52.
161 Ibid, p. 52.
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contributed to the downfall of the first civilian Minister of Defense of Poland but also
discredited the idea of civilian leadership of the military. As a result, after 1992 the Polish
General Staff under General Wilecki's leadership acted to increase its autonomy with full
support of the President. The threat to democracy was real. According to Jan Parys, there
was a "political struggle going on in Poland, a struggle over the future of the political
system in Poland: whether the system will be democratic or whether dictatorship will
prevail.
"
,62 Finally, it resulted in a new constitutional crisis in September 1994.
The adoption of the 'Small Constitution" in November 1992 was the first attempt
to clarify legislative and executive authority and to define the president's and
government's change, but in reality it was a hybrid "presidential-parliamentary" system.
Without doubt, it was a real political victory of President Walesa. The Constitution
reaffirmed the role and president's authority in foreign policy and national security affairs
(Articles 32 and 34). According to Article 35, the President remained the head of State
and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The 'Small Constitution" specified that
peacetime command of the Polish Army be exercised by the president of the republic and
by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. The president determines the
composition of military advisory bodies in peacetime and the composition of a war staff in
wartime. After consultation with the prime minister, the president appoints a minister of
national defense, after consultation with the minister of national defense, he appoints the
162
"Kariera szefa sztabu," Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 Febrary, 1995.
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chief of the General Staff. In turn, the minister is to consult with the president on
appointment of commanders of military districts and the individual services. 163
Supreme command of the military became again an issue between the President
and Cabinet when the electoral victory returned the former Communists and their allies to
power in September 1993. The new cabinet was headed by the leader of the Social
Democratic Party (SDP) Waldemar Pawlak and consisted of the coalition of two left-
centered parties. Originally, the new cabinet adopted the policy of cooperation with the
president. It seemed that the president and the cabinet would be able to provide a stable
and effective system of democratic control of the armed forces, but Walesa wanted to
prevent the growth of leftist influence within the armed forces. 164
According to Walesa's wish Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk was appointed as
defense minister. He claimed that he was a "civilian minister and would... set an example
ofhow a civilian minister of national defense should work. " 165 He also added that "the
most urgent issue that the Sejm would have to deal with was the new law on general
defense duties, which would result in a precise distribution ofpowers in controlling the
state's defense matters. " 166
163
"A Little Constitution in Poland," East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1992),
pp. 12-13., Louisa Vinton, "Poland's Little Constitution Clarifies Walesa's Powers," RFE/RL Research
Report, vol. 1, No. 3 5, 4 September 1992.
164 In accordance with Artcle 61 of the Small Constitution, a Prime Minister is required to consult with a
President regarding the appointment of the ministers of defense, foreign affairs and interior affairs.
However, the coalition allowed Walesa to appoint them by his own. For more information see Jeffrey
Simon, pp.62-63.
165 Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 27 October 1993, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-93-207 (28 October 1993), p. 21, and
Jeffrey Simon, p. 63.
166 Jeffrey Simon, p. 63.
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In November 1993 Walesa decided to reorganize KOK into NSC (National
Security Council) to have NSC as a highest organ responsible for defense and security
under the president. A government Committee for Defense Affairs (KSORM) that was
headed by the prime minister, would carry out the decisions of NSC. In this case the
constitutional changes including constitutional provision were needed, but the KOK
continued to operate without any constitutional amendment. 167
Despite the adoption of 'Small constitution", the necessity to define by law the
functions of the defense ministry and the General Staff remained unsolved as well as the
main issue: the absence of constitutional and legal provision for the scope of the
president's and prime minister's authority. By the end of January 1994 the Minister of
Defense raised the question regarding the evolution of security institutions. He again
insisted that "the Sejm needed to adopt appropriate constitutional and legal provisions to
define the scope of the president's and prime minister's authority...In addition, it was
necessary to amend the Small Constitution and the Law on General Duty of Defense of
the Republic to very precisely divide powers between the civilian defense minister and the
General Staff." ^
In May 1994, the minister of defense presented to the first session of the Council
of the Ministers Committee for Defense Affairs (KSORM) a document-'Defense Problem
and Military Aspects of the Polish Republic's Security Policies". It proposed that three






Chief of Staff. His title would be changed to General Inspector of the Armed Forces. It
was also assumed that General Inspector of the Armed Forces would be subordinated to
the Minister of Defense. President Walesa, in turn, disagreed with this idea. The direct
conflict between the President and the Minister of Defense became unavoidable. In June
1994, the KOK recommended to the Council of Ministers a document: 'Fundamental
Problems of the Polish Defense System". This paper was similar to defense minister's
document, but with just only one exception. The core issue of this document-the
subordination of the Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense-was omitted. 169
Soon afterwards, the open conflict of civil-military relations between the President
and government took place at September's senior army generals meeting at the Drawsko
Pomorskie training ground. The chief of Staff General Jan Wilecki supported Walesa's
wish to subordinate the general staff directly to the President of Poland, rather than to the
Minister of Defense. He refused to support the defense minister when President Walesa
polled the officers on Kolodziejczyk's competence. The officers took a vote of no-
confidence in defense minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk. To investigate this matter, a special
commission of the Sejm Defense Committee was established by the Parliament. In answers
to the questions of the commissions about carrying out orders of the civilian defense
ministers General Wilecki said: "/ always have, and will continue to do so. " Kolodziejczyk
countered, "I reject this statement. I will present to a special commission those cases in
which General Wilecki did not carry out my orders. " In response to the question whether
169 Jeffrey Simon, pp. 66-68.
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President Walesa asked the generals at Drawsko to vote for or against Kolodziejczyk,
Wilecki said: "I do not think there was a vote. " Kolodziejczyk countered: "The president
ordered a vote [on the question should the defense minister be dismissed]. All hands
except two went up. "170
The recommendations of the commission called: a) for the disciplining of the
officers involved in the incident; and b) for the reasserting of civilian control over military.
Instead of following of the Seim's recommendations "Walesa awarded bonuses to the
three top generals who participated; Chief of Staff Wilecki, Deputy Chief of Staff Leon
Komornicki, and Zdzislaw Ornatowski, commander of the SilesianMD ". 171
Walesa claimed that he lost confidence in Kolodziejczyk and the defense minister
lost his position. The tension with Waldemar Pawlak's government led to a new crisis in
late 1994, and resulted in the fall of the Cabinet in early 1995. 172
This conflict violated the democratic principles of civilian oversight. It harmed
nonpartisan military and exposed a profound institutional weakness of Polish democracy.
The deputy of Seim and former defense minister Komorowski noted: "The Drawsko affair
was very disquieting. It has not assumed the nature of a military coup, but this does not
mean its seriousness should be underestimated ", 173
One can suggest that there had been several political causes that ultimately led to
the crisis in Polish civil-military relations:
170 Jeffrey Simon, p. 68.
171 Jeffrey Simon, p. 72.
172 For more informations see "Political drama in Warsaw: uncivil relations ", ISSN Neivsbhef, February
1995, vol. 15, No. 2.
173 Jeffrey Simon, p. 69.
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Firstly, the origin of the crisis of the civil-military relations arose from a failure to
delegate authority between the President and government. The Sejm Defense Commission
demonstrated a full inability to exercise an effective oversight of the armed forces. The
activity of the defense ministry in providing an effective civilian control of the military was
paralyzed by President Walesa mainly because of his tremendous political ambitions and
irrepressive desire to secure monopoly of personal control over the armed forces. 174
Secondly, The Chief of Staff and general staff remained independent toward the
ministry of defense. The military elite tried to exploit the situation. As Rudolf Joo
observed: "In order to maintain its bargaining position in successive periods of crisis. It
was able gradually to enlarge its room for maneuver, and increased its leverage on
political processes. The Defense Staffsupported President Walesa's effort to personalize
civilian control as Supreme Commander, leaving routine administrative tasks to the
Ministry of Defense"} 1S The Army became politicized. Chief of Staff General Wilecki
made an attempt to establish complete autonomy vis-a-vis the government to build a 'fctate
within the state". 176
Thirdly, The lack of historical experience of civilian control over the armed forces
and the difficult choices imposed upon the military by the imperative of reform, including
174 Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the former defense minister of Poland, said. " It must be emphasized that, given
the complexity ofmilitary issues in contemporary era, no single individual can effectively control the
armedforces ".For more information see Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "Poland's Road to Civilian Control" in
Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, (ed. by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner) The Jones Hopkins
University Press, 1996, p. 106.
175 Rudolf Joo, pp. 28-29.
176 The First Deputy of the Minister of Defense of Poland Milewski expressed his own opinion toward
this situation. He said: "The military ought to be an instrument ofpolicy. Military cannot be politician ".
Warsaw PAP, 8 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-045 (8 March 1995), p. 21.
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reduction in the size of armed forces and the cutting of military budgets, reinforced the
perception among the officer corps that the politicians did not care about the real
problems of the army. This perception emerged because Walesa's view toward military
"arguing that 'military people should run the military, ' Walesa supported draft
legislation that would give greater power to the General Staff, reduce the role of the
defense ministry, and subordinate military intelligence to the General Staff. " 177
The process provoked heated debate in Parliament about the effectiveness of
ministerial political control, and led to speculation in the media about who is really in
charge in the Ministry of Defense. Consequently, the absence of a constitutional provision
contributed to the lack of effective civilian control of the armed forces, to government and
constitutional crises and the cabinet's collapse.
D. THE WAY FORWARD
The current, sixth reform stage, started in November 1995 when Walesa lost the
presidential election to the leader of the 'Union of Democratic Left", Alexander
Kwasniewski. 178 In reaction, the pro-Walesa Minister of Defense Okonski resigned and a
candidate from the Polish Peasant Party took over. Closer cooperation between President
Alexander Kwasniewski and Prime-minister Wlodzimiers Cimoszewicz opened the road
toward democratic civilian control over the armed forces. The process began when in
February 1996 Stanislaw Dobrzanski with full support of the President and Prime-minister
177 Jeffrey Simon, p. 71.
178 Warsaw PAP, 7 November 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-216 (8 November 1995), p.45, and Jeffrey Simon, "
NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations", NDU Press, 1996, p. 100.
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re-subordinated the WSI (intelligence and counterintelligence) and the General Staff Sixth
Directorate (the military post) under his authority as a defense minister. 179 Dobrzanski
also created the new military command structure with a new commander-the Chief of
Land Forces. He was responsible for education, infrastructure and logistics. Previously,
the General Staffwas responsible for this service. 180
In July 1996 the Council of Ministers made an important step in the direction of
civil-military reforms. It adopted a decree leading to the reorganization of defense
ministry. According to the reform, the General Staff was just part of the defense ministry.
It meant that the defense minister was in charge of all military affairs. It also assumed that
the Chief of Staff commands the Army only on behalf of the defense minister. 181
To eliminate the constitutional uncertainties in terms of civil-military relations and
democratic control over the armed forces a new constitution was needed. This
requirement hastened the constitution development process to replace the remnants of a
communist era and to create a democratic constitution The process started in Winter
1996 and finished in Summer 1997 when the new democratic constitution of Poland was
successfully adopted and confirmed by referendum. "The National Assembly of the
Republic ofPoland - made up of the two houses ofParliament, the Sejm and the Senate -
179 The Military Information Services and Academy of National Defense were subordinated directly to the
Defense Minister according to the Law of Defense, which went to the effect on 14 February 1996. Warsaw
Polska Zbrojna, 14 February 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-035 (21 February 1996), p. 57, and Jeffrey Simon,
p. 104.
180 Warsaw Polityka, 2 March 1996, pp. 3-7. FBIS-EEU-96 (6 March 1996), pp.40-41, and Jeffrey
Simon, p. 104.
181 Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 9 July 1996. FBIS-EUU-96-133 (10 July 1996), p.51, and Jeffrey
Simon, p. 109.
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approved the final draft of the country's first post-Communist constitution April 2, and
the majority ofPoles voting in the May 25 Constitutional Referendum, endorsed the draft
document. After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the document, it was
signed into law by President Aleksander Kwasniewski on July 16. " 182
According to the Constitution, the President gained a number of prerogatives
such as "the right to nominate the heads of the country's topjudicial bodies-including the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Administrative
Court and the chairman and vice-chairman of the Constitutional Tribunal - nominations
until now made by the Sejm. He also gained the right to name the top military leaders,
including the chief of the General Staff and the commanders in chief of the army, air
force, and navy. These nominations require the countersignatures of the Prime
Minister.
" 183
The President is to be "the supreme commander of the armedforces in peace
time, and executes thisfunction through the Minister ofDefense. The armedforces are to
remain neutral in political matters and are subject to civilian and democratic control. In
time of war, the President, at the recommendation of the Prime Minister, names a
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces" 1 *4 According to the Polish constitution, the
President has following prerogatives in terms of national security and defense matters:
Article 134






The President of the Republic shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Poland.
2. The President of the Republic, in times of peace, shall exercise command over
the Armed Forces through the Minister of National Defense.
3. The President of the Republic shall appoint, for a specified period of time, the
Chief of the General Staff and commanders of branches of the Armed Forces.
The duration of their term of office, the procedure for and terms of their
dismissal before the end thereof, shall be specified by statute.
4. The President of the Republic, for a period of war, shall appoint the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on request of the Prime Minister.
He may dismiss the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in accordance
with the same procedure. The authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, as well as the principle of his subordination to the constitutional
organs of the Republic of Poland, shall be specified by statute.
5
.
The President of the Republic, on request of the Minister of National Defense,
shall confer military ranks as specified by statute.
6. The authority of the President of the Republic, regarding his supreme command
of the Armed Forces, shall be specified in detail by statute. 185
E. CONCLUSION
I. The process of transformation of civil-military relations in Poland
proceeded under extremely difficult initial stages of reform and for a long period had
been guided by a communist-style constitution that unsuitable to the new political
185 Constitution Republic of Poland, International Constitutional Links. Available HTTP:
http://www.seim.gov.pl/eng/konst/konl.htm
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conditions. In spite of this fact, Poland made progress in democratic transformation
and in establishing democratic civilian control over the armed forces:
Firstly, Poland depoliticized the army, by dismantling all Communist Party organs
and eliminating the political officers.
Secondly, Poland provided the loyalty of the military to the new government.
Thirdly, Poland modified and then ended the ties between the military and
Moscow. This required a strategic reorientation and the development of Poland's
capability to determine its own defense policy and military doctrine directed to the West.
Fourthly, the democratically consolidated Polish parliament created the Sejm
Commission for Defense which had the right to oversee the armed forces through the
defense budget and to enter any military installation on demand.
Fifthly, the Polish President and Parliament did much to restore military prestige,
public trust and accountability in society. 186
II. Unfortunately, the absence of constitutional and legal frameworks for a
clear division of power led to constitutional and governmental crises, failure to
delegate authority over the military between the president and government. These
186 The Polish armed forces enjoy a very high degree of esteem of the population. "In Poland they have
retained the first place among all public institutions (with the approval rate between 72 and 80 percent
and disapproval of8 to 10 percent in 1992-1994) . The armedforces thus outdistanced even the once
most popula Polish institution-the Roman Catholic Church (whose approval rate was between 41 and 54
percent, and the dissaproval rate between 36 and 54 percent during the same period). Other civilian
institutions, including the president, cabinet and Parliament obtained much love scores. " Anton A.
Bebler, " Postscript" in Anton A.Bebler (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States
.Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, ( Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), pp. 131-132.
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circumstances led to violation of the principles of democratic civilian control over the
armed forces and had the following negative results:
Firstly, During the constitutional crisis, the Sejm Defense Commission
demonstrated weakness in effective oversight of the military.
Secondly, The activity of the defense ministry in providing an effective civilian
control over the General Staff and the armed forces was paralyzed by President Walesa.
This followed because of his political ambitions and his desire to impose a personal control
over the military. As a result, the Chief of Staff and General Staff remained independent of
the ministry of defense.
Thirdly, During the initial stages of democratic transformations neither Polish
military nor the new political leadership had experience in working together. The lack
of experience of civilian control over the armed forces and the difficult choices
imposed upon the military by the imperative of reform, including reduction in the size
of armed forces and the cutting of military budgets, reinforced the perception among
the officer corps that politicians care little about the real problems of the army.
Fourthly, The process provoked heated debate in Parliament about the
effectiveness of ministerial political control, and led to speculation in the media about
who was really in charge in the Ministry of Defense. This development harmed and
discredited the idea of civilian control of the military.
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Finally, the absence of a constitutional provision contributed to the lack of
effective civilian control of the armed forces, to government and constitutional crises
and the cabinet's collapse.
III. Despite the difficulties of the initial stages of transition, Poland reached
significant success in democratic transformation and in establishing a democratic system of
civil-military relations. Once the adoption of a new Constitution provided a clear line of
authority between the president and government, Poland made progress in personal
relations among new Polish leaders. They have come to respect one another. Closer
cooperation between President Alexander Kwasniewski and Prime-minister Wlodzimiers
Cimoszewicz opened the road toward democratic civilian control over the armed forces.
Finally, after the several years of intensive debate, negotiations and political struggle a
clear division of authority between president and government there emerged. The minister
of defense also has enough authority to provide effective leadership of the military. Now
the armed forces are subject to democratic control. In accordance with the new Polish
Constitution, President Aleksander Kwasniewski clarified the chain of command within the
Ministry of Defense and placed the Chief of the General Staff clearly under the authority
of the civilian minister. The law also transferred oversight of military intelligence from the
General Staff to the Ministry of Defense. The commission established to implement the
law, eliminated the General Staffs parallel and autonomous structures, reformed the




I. Healthy civil-military relations are an essential element of security for all of
Europe. For this reason, since 1991 NATO has made the promotion of democratically
controlled military a major part of its Cooperation Partnership agenda. The Alliance has
embarked on a host of activities designed to foster democratically controlled military
institutions, which will transform the relationship between NATO and Partner countries.
The establishment of effective civil-military relations in the Partner states forms an
important component of the overall political transition. A successful democratic transition
will remove a potential crisis area on NATO's borders. This development is also a main
prerequisite for integration of the Partner countries into Western defense.
H. Although civil-military relations of the post-communist states vary from
country to country, there are some important political principles universal for all states.
These should be take into consideration as a core problem in the transition to democratic
control over the armed forces.
Firstly, "a country which has no problems of civil-military relations and
democratic control is a country which has no democracy. "187
The tensions between civilians and military will endure because armed forces
constitute a conservative, hierarchical institution even within the democratic state. Thus,
*°7 Chris Donnelly, "Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the
Problem," NATO Review, No.l, January 1997, p. 17.
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the main task of a democratically consolidated government is to learn "how to cope with
reconciling a non-democratic institution within a democracy. " 188
Secondly, "every country will have a different solution to the problem which
they will have to work outfor themselves. "189
Civil-military relations reflect such important elements of historical and political
background of each country as:
a) role of the armed forces in historical development of the country;
b) democratic tradition of the society;
c) type of political regime;
d) interaction of the military and the society.
Thus, Western institutions can not solve this kind of problem. This is part of the
domestic agenda for each country.
Thirdly, "defense transformation, good civil-military relations and democratic
control are problems which must be solved They cannot be ignored or they will
destabilize society. "190
There are at least two aspects of the solution of these problems in terms of
democratic control over the military:
188 Chris Donnelly, p. 17.
189 Ibid, p. 17.
190 Ibid, p. 18.
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1.
Democratic civil-military relations protect against external threats and can check
tendencies to militarize governments for nationalist or even personal ambitions-something
we saw in Poland during Walesa's rule.
2. The process of democratic transformation is not only one of the most important
elements of democracy, but also an essential factor of defense capabilities. Consequently,
"it is in the interests of both the civilian government and the military authorities that it is
successfully achieved.
" 191
Fourthly, "democratic control is a two-way process between army and society,
not one where politicians simply dictate to soldiers. "192
Civilian government, as best it can, must provide the care, essential financing and
respect of the armed forces "in order that mutual trust, and a common interest in
resolving the problem, can be developed. The essence of this symbiosis is accountability.
The army is accountable to the government, the government is accountable to the army
and to parliament, andparliament is accountable to the people. " 193
The success in developing mutual trust and accountability between government
and armed forces depend on following factors:
• the necessity to establish a clear constitutional framework and the line of
authority between president, government and parliament in the military
matters:
191 Ibid, p. 18.
192
Ibid, p. 18.
193 Ibid, p. 18.
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• keeping the armed forces out of party's political influences in order to avoid
polarization of the military between political parties;
• need of having competent civilian specialists in defense issues ("civilianization"
of ministries of defense), because "If all advisers to defense policy-makers are
military, and policy-makers are ignorant of military realities, then the army,
not the government, is controlling defense policy.
"194
• necessity of the full integration of professional military into civilian society.
Military in the post-communist countries still don't trust civilians because of
the lack of historical experience of civilian control over the armed forces and
the difficult choices imposed upon the military by the imperative of reform.
These steps, including the reduction in the size of armed forces and the cutting
of military budgets, reinforced the perception among the officer corps that the
politicians don't care about the real problems of the army. It remains a serious
problem and results in resistance of military to develop democratic civilian
control.
HI. To conclude, in order to transform from a communist to a democratic political
system, all post-communist countries must establish a mechanism of democratic civilian
control over the armed forces and institutionalize democratic military professionalism.
194 Ibid, p. 18.
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